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The Separate Nature of the Religious
Accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab
Minority in Israel
Michael M. Karayanni*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

For Israelis, religious affiliation means much more than an expression of
freedom of conscience. Religious identity can also serve as a connecting factor
between the self and a legal system. 1 A person’s religion in Israel will serve to
identify the governing law in a number of family law matters just as the place
where a tort has been committed, the place of a contract, or the place of domicile
can serve as factors identifying the governing law of a certain relationship. The
most evident example of this is the law governing matters of marriage and divorce:
Israeli citizens are governed by their religious community court and religious
community law in such matters. 2 This reality of having one’s personal law, instead
*

Vice-Dean and holder of the Edward S. Silver Chair in Civil Procedure, Faculty of Law, the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. LL.B., Bar Ilan University, LL.M., George Washington University; LL.D.,
Hebrew University of Jerusalem; S.J.D., University of Pennsylvania. The research conducted for writing
this article was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant 385/05), the Harry S. Truman Institute
for the Advancement of Peace, and the Minerva Center for Human Rights of the Faculty of Law, the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
An earlier version of this article that dealt with the multicultural aspects of religious accommodations
in Israel was presented at a conference organized by the Center of Comparative Constitutionalism of the
University of Chicago Law School in January 2004. I would like to thank the organizers of the conference,
Martha Nussbaum and Cass Sunstein, for inviting me, and together with them to also thank all of the other
participants of the conference for their helpful and valuable comments. A more advanced version of the
article was presented at a conference organized by the Minerva Center for Human Rights of the Faculty of
Law of the Hebrew University and the Faculty of Law of the University of Heidelberg held in Heidelberg,
Germany in July 2005. I would also like to thank a number of colleagues and friends who made comments
at the last stage of writing the article, especially Barak Medina, Daniel Statman and Steven Wilf and to
Sharon Shakargy and Ehud Brosh for their excellent research assistance.
1
See Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Personal Law and Human Rights in India and Israel, 34 I SR.
L. REV. 101 (2000).
2
See Amnon Rubinstein, Law and Religion in Israel, 2 I SR. L. REV. 380, 384-88 (1967) [hereinafter
Rubinstein, Law and Religion]; see also Asher Maoz, Religious Human Rights in the State of Israel, in
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES: LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 349, 355 (Johan D. van der
Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Maoz, Religious Human Rights]; Asher Maoz,
Enforcement of Religious Courts Judgments Under Israeli Law, 33 J. CHURCH & ST . 473 (1991).
This also means that when litigating matters of marriage and divorce before the religious courts, the
parties need to abide by the procedure devised by that particular court that could also be influenced by
religious notions. This is particularly relevant to rules dealing with the capacity of witnesses to testify
before a religious court, rules that are able to explicitly discriminate on the basis of gender and the religious
affiliation of the witness. In this respect, local rules dealing with the conflict of jurisdictional authority of
the different religious courts, or between a religious court and the civil court, resemble to a great extent the
methodology applied in the sphere of private international law. As it is well known in the teachings of this
latter discipline, forums follow their own local law (the lex fori) in matters of procedure even when the
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of the state’s territorial law, governing certain family law matters is in essence a
legacy from the Ottoman Empire’s millet system. 3
However, control of marriage and divorce is only one of many other spheres
in which religion is of regulatory significance. Historically, religion in Israel
dictated policies concerning official holidays and days of rest, public education in
schools and higher education, public transportation, burials, the handling of
cemeteries and even regulations of the importation of meat. 4 As a result, it is
widely admitted that Israel does not exhibit separation between religion and state. 5
Nonetheless, the question arises whether this entanglement of religion and
state is of the same nature and to the same extent in all the religious communities
that exist in Israel. 6 The answer this article provides is in the negative. Though
there is no separation between religion and state in Israel, separation does exist in
the nature and justification for the existing religious accommodations of the Jewish
majority on the one hand and those of the Palestinian-Arab minority on the other
hand. The article asserts that because of the Jewish nature of the State of Israel,
almost all of the apparatuses governing the “religion and state” debate have
centered around Judaism. Religious accommodations granted to the PalestinianArab minority, on the other hand, were relegated to a separate realm—that of
minority (group) accommodations. The result of this disparate treatment has led to
a “paradigm of separateness” in religion and state relations in Israel. The political
and legal environment in Israel has also reinforced this “paradigm of separateness,”
especially in light of the national conflict that exists between the Palestinian-Arab
minority in Israel and the state itself.
The article begins by giving an overview of the diverse nature of the
population in Israel both in terms of its national composition and in terms of the
religious affiliation of its citizens. This discussion, that takes place in section I,
also seeks to characterize the type of issues typically dealt with when relating to
national and religious tensions in Israel. After observing how entrenched the
paradigm of separateness is in the religion and state debate, section II of the article
discusses in detail how this paradigm was constructed. Section III identifies two
major forces that have worked to re-enforce the paradigm of separateness ove r the
years: external factors related to the overall Israeli policy towards the PalestinianArab minority, and internal factors related to intra Palestinian-Arab social and
political dynamics. Section IV of the article highlights the fact that the paradigm of
separateness as identified here has normative implications as well.
governing law (the lex causae) happens to be the law of a foreign country. See IZHAK ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS
LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL SYSTEM 177-98 (1975).
3
Amnon Rubinstein, State and Religion in Israel, 2 J. CONTEMP . HIST . 107, 111-12 (1967) [hereinafter
Rubinstein, State and Religion].
4
See THE STATE OF ISRAEL, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR): COMBINED INITIAL AND FIRST PERIODIC REPORT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
226-45 (1998) [hereinafter I SRAELI ICCPR REPORT ].
5
David Kretzmer, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 39, 48 (Amos Shapira
& Keren C. DeWitt-Arrar eds., 1995); Izhak Englard, Law and Religion in Israel, 35 A M. J. COMP . L. 185,
192 (1987); Pnina Lahav, The Status of Women in Israel – Myth and Reality, 22 A M. J. COMP . L. 107
(1974).
6
Reference to Israel as made in this article relates to the pre-1967 borders of the State of Israel.
Consequently, the discussion does not relate to East Jerusalem, or to any other territory occupied by Israel
during the Six-Day War.
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Israel is a diverse country and nearly one-fifth of the total population,
consisting of about 1.2 million citizens, is Palestinian-Arab, while the rest of the
population is predominantly Jewish. 7 The religious composition of the non-Jewish
population is made-up of Moslems, Christians and Druze. 8 Moreover, within the
different religious groups themselves, there are a number of various factions. The
Jewish community is divided into secular, traditional, and religious groups, 9 with
the latter containing a well-established Ultra-Orthodox camp. 10 In addition, Reform
and Conservative Judaism have gained force recently creating new challenges to
the dominant Orthodox establishment. 11 The Christian population is divided into
ten recognized religious congregations, 12 and each has its own body of institutions
including a court system. In some cases these congregations even have substantial
ties to foreign governments. 13
The existence of different national and religious groups in Israel has been a
constant source of tension. On the national level, the most obvious tension is
between the Palestinian-Arab minority and the Jewish majority. Moreover, since
Israel as a state is officially defined on national, ethnic and religious grounds as a
Jewish state, this national conflict has, in many cases, also turned into a conflict
between the Palestinian-Arab minority and the Israeli establishment as a whole. 14
Underlying this national tension is of course the overall Israeli- Arab (Palestinian)
conflict that has left both sides not only with a great amount of anguish and grief
7

The total population of Israel was estimated for the year 2001 to be 6,439,000, out of which 1,227,500
(18.76%) is Palestinian-Arab. See 53 STATISTICAL A BSTRACT OF ISRAEL 2002, tbl. 2.1 (Jerusalem: 2002).
The full tables are available at http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnatonenew.htm. Though it should be noted that the
Palestinian-Arab population in the official statistics of Israel include the Palestinian-Arab population of
East Jerusalem as well.
8
The Jewish population is estimated for the year 2001 to be 4,990,200 (77.50%), the Moslem 987,300
(15.33%), the Christian Arab 112,200 (1.74%), other Christians 24,600 (0.38%), Druze 105,000 (1.63%)
and a total of 216,200 (3.35%) is unclassified. STATISTICAL A BSTRACT , supra note 7. An additional
recognized religious community is Baha’i. The official statistics do not have any specific category for the
Baha’i, but their number barely exceeds a couple of thousand.
9
See SHLOMIT LEVY ET AL ., A PORTRAIT OF ISRAELI JEWRY , BELIEFS, OBSERVATIONS, AND VALUES
AMNG ISRAELI JEWS 5-6 (2002).
10
GAD BARZILAI, COMMUNITIES AND THE LAW , POLITICS AND CULTURES OF LEGAL IDENTITIES 10-11,
55-56 (2003).
11
See Ephraim Tabory, The Israel Reform and Conservative Movements and the Market for Liberal
Judaism, in JEWS IN ISRAEL: CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PATTERNS 285 (Uzi Rebhun &
Chaim I. Waxman eds., 2004).
12
M ARTIN EDELMAN , COURTS, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 3 (1994).
13
See URI BIALER, CROSS ON THE STAR OF DAVID: THE CHRISTIAN WORLD IN ISRAEL’S FOREIGN
POLICY, 1948-1967 (2005); see also HCJ 963/04 Loiffer v. The Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(3)
326 (holding that courts in Israel have a limited form of judicial review over government handling of the
election of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch given the fact the whole subject also implicates Israel’s foreign
policy).
14
See, e.g., JACOB M. LANDAU, THE A RABS IN ISRAEL, A POLITICAL STUDY (1969); ELIA ZURIEK, THE
PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL: A STUDY IN INTERNAL COLONIALISM (1979); IAN LUSTICK, A RABS IN THE JEWISH
STATE: ISRAEL’S CONTROL OF A NATIONAL M INORITY (1980); Sammy Smooha & Don Peretz, The Arabs in
Israel, 26 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 451 (1982); CLAUDE KLEIN, ISRAEL AS A NATION-STATE AND THE PROBLEM
OF THE A RAB MINORITY: IN SEARCH OF A STATUS (1987); Sammy Smooha, Minority Status in an Ethnic
Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel, 13 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 389 (1990); JACOB M.
LANDAU, THE A RAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL, 1967-1991: POLITICAL A SPECTS (1993); NADIM N. ROUHANA,
PALESTINIAN CITIZENS IN AN ETHNIC JEWISH STATE: IDENTITIES IN CONFLICT (1997).
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over the loss of so great a number of human lives but also with constitutive national
narratives. The Palestinian narrative has stressed the tragic outcome whereby the
majority of the Palestinian people were deprived of their homeland, and the Jewish
(Zionist) national narrative has stressed the emancipation of the Jewish people by
becoming sovereign in a state of their own. 15
On the religious level, the most apparent field of tension is intra-Jewish, and
its manifestation is multifaceted. One of these facets is the application of Jewish
religious norms, particularly those of the orthodox approach to regulate the
personal legal status of Jews. This includes matters pertaining to the law of
marriage and divorce, 16 or in setting the standards in defining who is a Jew, mainly
for immigration purposes and public records. 17 Another facet is the extent to which
Jewish religious norms should regulate the public domain, such as laws penalizing
Jewish shop owners who operate their business on the Sabbath or laws prohibiting
public transportation from operating on the Sabbath. 18 A third facet is the public
funding of Jewish religious institutions, be they religious councils or school
systems of the various religious factions. 19
The secular-religious friction among the Jewish community has frequently
been the cause of intense debate. 20 Protagonists within the secular camp have
argued against the coercive nature of the religious norms, especially in matters
pertaining to marriage and divorce, and have persistently called for limiting public
funding for Jewish religious institutions. The Jewish religious camp, on the other
hand, has called for a tolerant stand toward Jewish religious norms and Jewish
religious institutions, frequently invoking the need to preserve Jewish religious
heritage and the fostering of Jewish unity. 21 Interestingly, an unofficial pact has
been reached between political leaders representing both camps, a pact that has
managed so far to maintain the various religious normative institutions. Referred to
in Israel as that of the “status quo,”22 this reality has been challenged over the years,
15

Yochanan Peres, Ethnic Relations in Israel, 76 A M. J. SOC. 1021, 1028 (1971) (“It is a commonplace
that the relationship between Israeli Jews and Arabs as ethnic groups has to be understood in the context of
the wider Arab-Israeli conflict.”); see also Judith T. Shuval, The Structure and Dilemmas of Israeli
Pluralism, in THE ISRAELI STATE AND SOCIETY, BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS 216, 229, 233 (Baruch
Kimmerling ed., 1989).
16
Erica R. Clinton, Chains of Marriage: Israeli Women’s Fight for Freedom, 3 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST . 283, 291 (1999).
17
See Ayelet Shachar, Whose Republic?: Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Polity, 13 GEO.
IMMIGR . L.J. 233, 245-47 (1999); Mark J. Altschul, Israel’s Law of Return and the Debate of Altering,
Repealing, or Maintaining its Present Language, 2002 U. ILL. L. RE V. 1345, 1352-55 (2002).
18
Rubinstein, State and Religion, supra note 3, at 110-11.
19
Stephen Goldstein, The Teaching of Religion in Government Funded Schools in Israel, 26 I SR . L. RE V.
36 (1992).
20
See Martin Edelman, A Portion of Animosity: The Politics of the Disestablishment of Religion in
Israel, 5 I SR . STUD . 204 (2000).
21
See GERSHON SHAFIR & YOAV PELED, BEING ISRAELI: THE DYNAMICS OF M ULTIPLE CITIZENSHIP 142
(2002); Patricia J. Woods, Gender and the Reproduction and Maintenance of Group Boundaries, Why the
“Secular” State Matters to Religious Authorities in Israel, in BOUNDARIES AND BELONGING, STATES AND
SOCIETIES IN THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE IDENTITIES AND LOCAL PRACTICES 226, 235-42 (Joel S. Migdal ed.,
2004).
22
Actually, the status quo agreement precedes the establishment of the State of Israel. It was first
formulated in a letter on June 19, 1947 by David Ben-Gurion, then the Head of the Jewish Agency, to
Agudath Israel, an Ultra-Orthodox and an anti-Zionist religious organization, in which an outline was made
with respect to the attitude to be adopted by the future Jewish state towards religious demands. While the
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making the relationship between Jewish religious institutions and norms with
secular liberal ideals a persistent matter of debate among all factions of the Jewish
community. 23
¶9
Despite its complicated character, the religion and state debate in Israel has
one additional feature that is rather plain and straightforward. The discussion paid
little attention to “religion and state” issues among the Palestinian-Arab minority in
Israel. Specifically, matters pertaining to public accommodations for non-Jewish
religious institutions have escaped the sharp scrutiny associated with religion and
state in Israel in general. The public dialogue concerning religion and state in
Israel is often reduced to a conversation about synagogue and state. 24
¶10
This should not be taken to mean that there are no religion and state tensions
concerning the religious accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab minority,
whether in terms of government policy toward their religious institutions, 25 or in
terms of the illiberal nature of the norms applied by Palestinian-Arab religious
communities to their members. 26 For indeed there are. However, the discussion of
these matters was conducted for the most part as a particular issue within the more
general topic of the collective status of the Palestinian-Arab minority, as a no nJewish minority that came under Israeli rule. And in this context, the
accommodations granted to the Palestinian-Arab religious communities were taken
to be a form of a minority (group) accommodation that is pluralistic and
autonomous in nature. 27 So if authority is conceded to the Palestinian-Arab
religious communities giving them power to adjudicate personal status matters of
letter stated that the future state would essentially be a secular state, it nevertheless stated the following
four guarantees: (a) the Sabbath will be the official day of rest, while the non-Jewish population will be
entitled to its own days of rest; (b) dietary laws of Kosher food will be observed in any state-owned
establishment to which Jews resort; (c) the continuation of rabbinical courts’ jurisdiction over personal
status matters; (d) a separate system of religious schools would be maintained. See Rubinstein, State and
Religion, supra note 3, at 113.
23
See Gerald M. Steinberg, Interpretations of Jewish Tradition on Democracy, Land, and Peace, 43 J.
CHURCH & ST . 93, 98-101 (2001).
24
See Lucy E. Bassli, Note, The Future of Combining Synagogue and State in Israel: What Have We
Learned in the First 50 Years?, 22 HOUST . J. INT ’L L. 477 (2000); Asher Maoz, State and Religion in
Israel, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHURCH AND STATE 239, 239 (Menachem Mor ed., 1993)
[hereinafter Maoz, State and Religion].
25
See ROBERT H. EISENMAN, ISLAMIC LAW IN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL (1978); A LISA RUBIN-PELED,
DEBATING ISLAM IN THE JEWISH STATE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY TOWARD ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN
ISRAEL (2001).
26
See A HARON LAYISH , W OMEN AND ISLAMIC LAW IN A NON-M USLIM STATE: A STUDY BASED ON
DECISIONS OF THE SHARI 'A COURT IN ISRAEL (1975); Andrew Trietel, Conflicting Traditions: Muslim
Shari’a Courts and Marriage Age Regulation in Israel, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403 (1995).
27
See Ilan Saban, Minority Rights in Deeply Divided Societies: A Framework for Analysis and the Case
of the Arab-Palestinian Minority in Israel, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT 'L L . & POL. 885, 900, 942-48, 954-60 (2004)
(characterizing the religious accommodations granted to the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel as a
“group-differentiated right” and as a “modest form of self-government”); DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL
STATUS OF THE A RABS IN ISRAEL 163-68 (1990) (discussing the religious organization of the PalestinianArab religious communities under the heading of “group rights”) [hereinafter KRETZMER, LEGAL STATUS];
see also Itzhak Zamir, Shivyon Zekhuyot Klapey Aravim be-Israel [Equality of Rights for Arabs in Israel], 9
M ISHPAT U-MIMSHAL 11, 26, 30 (2005) (in Hebrew) (regarding the jurisdiction of Palestinian-Arab
religious communities to adjudicate matters of marriage and divorce as a group right); 1 A MNON
RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, HA-M ISHPAT HA-HUKATI SHEL M EDINAT YISRAEL [THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL] 429-35 (6th ed. 2005) (in Hebrew) (referring to the religious organization of
the Palestinian-Arab religious communities as a limited form of self-government).
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their members, it is conceded because of Israel’s proclaimed democratic norms that
seek to respect the religious diversity among its non-Jewish religious communities.
Thus, in terms of normative justification, the religious accommodations for the
Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel are a continuation of the long-standing Ottoman
millet system by which minority religions were tolerated by granting leaders of
religious minorities jurisdictional powers over their members. 28 This ontology is
inherently different from the one that characterizes the religious accommodations
pertaining to the Jewish majority. Given the Jewish nature of the State of Israel
such accommodations were configured as yet another public feature, albeit
controversial at times, of the State of Israel as a Jewish state. Obviously a great
deal of this entanglement is owed to the inherent entanglement of religion and
nation within Judaism itself. 29 But still, it is Israel’s definition as a Jewish state,
and not its definition as a democratic state, that has justified the religious
accommodations granted to Jewish religious institutions and Jewish religious
norms. Consequently, after the establishment of the state of Israel as a Jewish state
it can no longer be said that the Jewish community in Israel is just another millet.30
Rather, the matter of Jewish religious accommodations has essentially been
“nationalized” thus becoming part of Israel’s “public” sphere. 31
¶11
This schism in the nature of the religious accommodations relevant to each of
the two communities is what this author has chosen to call the “paradigm of
separateness” in religion and state relations in Israel. And this schism also explains
why in fact the religion and state debate in Israel has excluded the Palestinian-Arab
community. For if the debate on religion and state focuses on the public nature of
religious accommodations, it was only natural that in the Israeli context the debate
will focus on what dominated Israel’s public sphere: the religious accommodations
granted to the Jewish community. Issues of religion and state of the PalestinianArab minority, characterized as a group accommodation of an autonomous nature
of the different non-Jewish religious communities, were taken to be of a “private”
28
See Benjamin Braude, Foundation Myths of the Millet System, in 1 CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE 69 (Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis eds., 1982); W ALTER F. W EIKER, OTTOMAN
TURKS AND THE JEWISH POLITY: A HISTORY OF THE JEWS OF TURKEY (1992); CHARLES A. FRAZEE,
CATHOLICS AND THE SULTANS: THE CHURCH AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1983).
29
See Maoz, State and Religion, supra note 24, at 243 (“Divest Jewish culture and heritage from
religious elements and one is left rather empty handed.”). Therefore, scholars in Israel who seek to
legitimize the Jewish character of the State of Israel go out of their way to stress how wrong it is to impose
Jewish religious norms on members that do not opt for a religious lifestyle. See A LEXANDER YAKOBSON &
A MNON RUBINSTEIN, YISRAEL U-M ISHPAHAT HA-AMIM : M EDINAT LE’OM YEHUDIT U-ZEKHUYOT HAA DAM [ISRAEL AND THE FAMILY OF NATIONS: JEWISH NATION-STATE AND HUMAN RIGHTS] 150-65 (2003)
(in Hebrew); A SA KASHER, RUAH ISH : A RBA‘AH SHE‘ARIM [SPIRIT OF A M AN: FOUR GATES] 19 (2000) (in
Hebrew).
30
Rubinstein, Law and Religion, supra note 2, at 408 (noting that while under the Ottoman rule and the
British mandate the religious accommodations granted to the Jewish community were motivated by the
value of autonomy and the interest of not intervening in the internal affairs of the Jewish community, the
reason today is the “reverse”: the interest is that of preserving the unity of the Jewish People).
31
I have previously doubted the normative utility of the public/private distinction, given the fact that
many public interests can be translated into private ones and vice versa. See Michael M. Karayanni, The
Myth and Reality of a Controversy: “Public Factors” and the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, 21 W IS.
INT ’L L.J. 327 (2003). Nonetheless, I do think that the distinction can still contribute to our understanding
of certain factual and normative patterns, at least in such cases in which the pattern itself has taken the
distinction to be a valid one. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN . L.
REV. 1 (1992).
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nature and thus beyond the parameters of Israel’s religion and state debate. The
discussion in the following sections essentially describes in greater detail how this
paradigm of separateness was constitutionally, politically and socially erected.
III. THE PARADIGM OF SEPARATENESS
A. The Constitutional Configuration of the Religion and State Conflict in
Israel
¶12

The constitutional definition of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state” has
been at the forefront of legal debates for over a decade now. 32 Passionate
arguments have been put forward claiming that the two concepts are compatible, 33
and are in fact only one variation of the nation-state structure existing in many
other countries. 34 Yet others have claimed that the two terms are inherently at
odds.35 A state that defines itself as a Jewish state will necessarily undermine the
rights of non-Jews and even Jews themselves if the Jewish nature of the state
embodies principles that stand against their own personal ideals. Yet a third camp
has claimed that while there is an apparent tension between the two concepts, they
could be made consonant through interpretation. As the argument goes, this is
possible due in a large part to the elastic nature of Jewish and democratic norms,
for if both are brought to their minimal core values, a Jewish state can still be
considered to be democratic. 36
¶13
The enactment in 1992 of two major Basic Laws, Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation37 and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 38 a step considered as
constituting a form of a constitutional revolution, 39 accelerated this debate. While
32

See, e.g., RAV-TARBUTIYUT BI -M EDINAH DEMOKRATIT VI -YEHUDIT : SEFER HA -ZIKARON LE -A RIEL
ROSEN-ZVI ZA”L [M ULTICULTURALISM IN A DEMOCRATIC AND JEWISH STATE: THE A RIEL ROSEN-ZVI
M EMORIAL BOOK] (Menachem Mautner et al. eds., 1998) (in Hebrew); A DAM D. DANÉL, MEDINAH
YEHUDIT VE -DEMOKRATIT : M ABAT RAV-TARBUTI [A JEWISH AND DEMOCRATIC STATE: A
M ULTICULTURALIST VIEW ] (2003) (in Hebrew).
33
Menachem Elon, The Values of a Jewish and Democratic State: The Task of Reaching a Synthesis, in
ISRAEL A MONG THE NATIONS 177 (Alfred E. Kellermann et al. eds., 1998); Maoz, Religious Human Rights,
supra note 24, at 358 (“[t]he Jewishness of the State of Israel does not contradict its democratic nature”).
See also HCJ 6698/95, Qa’adan v. Minhal Mikarke’ei Israel [2000] IsrSC 54(1) 258, 282 (stressing, per
President Barak, that there is no contradiction between Israel’s values as a Jewish and democratic state and
complete equality between its citizens).
34
The forme r president of the Supreme Court of Israel, Meir Shamgar, once observed: “The existence
of the State of Israel, as the state of the Jewish people does not negate its democratic character, just as the
Frenchness of France does not negate its democratic character.” Election Appeal 1/88 Neiman v. Chairman
of the Central Elections Committee for the Twelfth Knesset [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 177, 189.
35
See Nadim Rouhana, The Political Transformation of the Palestinians in Israel: From Acquiescence
to Challenge, 18 J. PALESTINIAN STUD. 38, 40-41 (1989) (“a state that is defined as belonging to only one
people, when its population is composed of two, cannot offer equal opportunity to all its citizens”).
36
See RUTH GAVISON, YISRAEL KI-MEDINAH YEHUDIT VE -DEMOKRATIT : MET AKHIM VE -SIKUYIM [CAN
ISRAEL BE BOTH JEWISH AND DEMOCRATIC: TENSIONS AND PROSPECTS] (1999) (in Hebrew).
37
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, S.H. 1454. For an English translation see Basic Law: Freedom
of Occupation (1994), http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic4_eng.htm (last visited Dec. 4,
2006).
38
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, S.H. 1391. For an English translation see Basic Law, Human
Dignity and Liberty, http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2006).
39
See Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in
American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. RE V. 309 (1995); Ran Hirschl, Israel’s “Consitutional
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these laws were not the first basic laws enacted by the Knesset, 40 they were unique
as they related specifically to certain basic human rights such as human dignity,
liberty, mobility, privacy, and property. 41 Furthermore, these basic laws have also
elevated the status of the norms they protect to a higher level in the general
hierarchy of laws by providing the courts with some level of judicial review. 42
However, relevant to our discussion is the fact that in both of these laws, the values
of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state were also explicitly stated as
a purpose that these laws seek to promote.
¶14
Nevertheless, one should not be misled to think that the existing tension
between the Jewish nature of the State of Israel and democratic norms has surfaced
only recently. Ever since the state’s inception, the comprehensive structure of the
Israeli legal system has evolved and continues to evolve around these two ideals:
the existence of a Jewish state that provides more than lip service to Jewish
religious norms and Zionist teachings, and a state that also respects democratic
principles and freedoms for all citizens of Israel, Jewish and non-Jewish alike. 43
Such a normative agenda was already evident in Israel’s Declaration of
Independence which simultaneously recognized Israel as a Jewish state that would
open its door to every Jew, granting the Jewish people the status of a nation with
equal rights among the family of nations, and yet promised to develop the country
for the benefit of all its inhabitants, maintaining complete equality of political and
social rights for all citizens, irrespective of race, religion, or gender. 44
¶15
The ensuing formative decades of Israel were characterized by the
development of legal landmarks that worked to give substance to the Jewish nature
of the state, as well as to guarantee certain democratic freedoms. These two
competing norms were evident when the Knesset enacted laws considered by many
to represent the central ethos of the Jewish state; the Law of Return, 1950, 45 in
which every Jew in the world was granted the right to immigrate to Israel and

Revolution”: The Legal Interpretation of Entrenched Civil Liberties in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic
Order, 46 A M. J. COMP . L. 427 (1998). Cf. David Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A
Mini-Revolution in Israeli Constitutional Law?, 26 I SR. L. REV. 238 (1992).
40
In addition the following basic laws exist: Basic Law (The Knesset), 12 LSI 85 (1957-58) (Isr.); Basic
Law: Israel Lands, 14 LSI 48 (1960) (Isr.); Basic Law: The President of the State, 18 LSI 111 (1963-64)
(Isr.); Basic Law: The Government, 22 LSI 257 (1967-68) (Isr.)(replaced in 1992); Basic Law: The State
Economy, 29 LSI 273 (1974-75) (Isr.); Basic Law: The Army, 30 LSI 150 (1975-76) (Isr.); Basic Law:
Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 34 LSI 209 (1979-80) (Isr.); Basic Law: Judicature, 38 LSI 101 (1983-84)
(Isr.); Basic Law: The State Comptroller, 42 LSI 24 (1987-88) (Isr.). For background information about the
whole enterprise of basic law enactment in Israel, see Asher Maoz, The Institutional Organization of the
Israeli Legal System, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 11, 12-13 (Amos Shapira & Keren C.
DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995).
41
See, e.g., Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal System as a Result of the Basic
Laws and its Effect on Procedural and Substantive Criminal Law, 31 I SR. L. REV. 3 (1997).
42
See Gary J. Jacobsohn, After the Revolution, 34 ISR . L. RE V. 139 (2000). On the nature of judicial
review in Israeli constitutional law after the enactment of the two mentioned basic laws see Menachem
Hofnung, The Unintended Consequence of Unplanned Constitutional Reform: Constitutional Politics in
Israel, 44 A M. J. COMP . L. 585 (1996).
43
See Kretzmer, Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 39; Dan Avnon, The Israeli Basic Laws’
(Potentially) Fatal Flaw, 32 I SR . L. RE V. 535 (1998).
44
See Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 LSI 3 (1948) (Isr.).
45
Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 (1949-50) (Isr.).
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thereupon, through the working of the Nationality Law, 1952, 46 become an Israeli
citizen. 47 At the same time, the judiciary worked relentlessly to carve out, almost
from scratch, such basic rights as the freedom of expression, freedom of
association, and more. 48 Similarly, while the Knesset worked to enact a general law
guaranteeing equal treatment of all women in Israel, 49 the legal system, guided by
the Israeli Supreme Court, realized the necessity to create, also from scratch, a legal
doctrine that restricts the participation of a list of candidates for the parliamentary
elections that adopt a political agenda purporting to negate the Jewish nature of the
State of Israel, which the court regarded as a basic constitutional fact. 50
¶16
The debate over the Jewish and democratic nature of the State of Israel will
certainly continue well into the future. However, it is also equally true, that past
debates and arguments have already established a number of constitutional
paradigms. One very important paradigm concerns the public sphere in the State of
Israel that is principally committed to Jewish collective ideals. 51 Thus it was
natural that the flag, national emblem, anthem and official holidays of the state
would be identified, as a matter of course, with the Jewish tradition. 52 Jewish
Zionist organizations, such as the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish
Agency, received official status 53 and under the auspices of the law they are “to
continue acting within the State of Israel for developing and settling the land,
absorption of immigrants from the Diaspora and coordination in Israel of Jewish
institutions and organizations active in the field.”54 But the Jewish domination of
46

Nationality Law, 5712-1952, 6 LSI 50 (1951-52) (Isr.).
See Rubinstein, Law and Religion, supra note 2, at 413 (characterizing the Law of Return as the
raison d être of Israel as a Jewish State). See also HOWARD M. SACHAR, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL: FROM THE
RISE OF ZIONISM TO OUR TIME 395 (1996) (noting that the very raison d’être of Israeli statehood was to
provide "a homeland for all who wished to forsake the Diaspora and come home”).
48
See Allen Zysblat, Protecting Fundamental Rights, in Israel without a Written Constitution, in PUBLIC
LAW IN ISRAEL 47 (Izhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996); Asher Maoz, Defending Civil Liberties
without a Constitution – The Israeli Experience, 16 M ELB. U. L. REV. 815 (1988); Amos Shapira, The
Status of Fundamental Individual Rights in the Absence of a Written Constitution, 9 I SR. L. REV. 497
(1974).
49
Women’s Equal Rights Law, 5711-1951, 5 LSI 171 (1950-51) (Isr.).
50
Election Appeal 1/65 Yardor v. Central Election Committee for the Sixth Knesset [1965] IsrSC 19(3)
365 (per President Simon Agranat). The power to disqualify a list of candidates who wish to run for
elections to the Knesset received statutory recognition in 1984, when the Basic Law: The Knesset was
amended to include the following provision (section 7A): “A list of candidates shall not participate in the
elections for the Knesset if its aims or actions, expressly or by implication, point to one of the following:
(1) negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the State of the Jewish people; (2) negation of the
democratic nature of the State; (3) incitement to racism.” Based on subsections (2) and (3), the Supreme
Court in Israel upheld the disqualifications of Me’ir Kahane’s Kach party in 1988 who called for a variety
of racist restrictions to be imposed on the Palestinian-Arab community in Israel. See Election Appeal 1/88
Neiman v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Twelfth Knesset [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 177.
51
See Mark A. Tessler, The Middle East: The Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and the Arabs in Israel, in
PROTECTION OF ETHNIC M INORITIES 245, 247 (Robert G. Wirsing ed., 1981) (noting the official
commitment of the State of Israel to its Jewish identity and how the State of Israel “is officially committed
to perpetuating and enriching the Jewish heritage and to meeting the needs of Jews throughout the world”).
52
For a survey of state-enacted laws that deal with state symbols see KRETZMER, LEGAL STATUS, supra
note 27, at 17-22; see also BARZILAI, supra note 10, at 110 (“State law officially recognizes no ArabPalestinian festival.”).
53
World Zionist Organization – Jewish Agency (Status) Law, 5713-1952, 7 LSI 3 (1952-53) (Isr.).
54
It is als o worth mentioning that the specific role and function of WZO and the Jewish Agency were
defined in covenants signed between them and the Government of Israel. Such covenants enabled WZO
47
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the public sphere goes beyond such symbols. 55 The concept of citizenship, for
example, has also been influenced by the Jewish nature of Israel. 56 There are two
types of citizenship: the first type is republican in nature and has strong collective
goals of a shared moral purpose, a perception of the common good and core civic
values. 57 The second type, individual in nature—relevant to the non-Jewish
population—builds on liberal ideals of personal (not collective) rights. Another
example concerns the official state language. Though under the black letter of the
law, Arabic and Hebrew are both considered official languages, it is Hebrew that
dominates the public sphere. 58 Indeed, on some occasions courts have even
compelled public bodies to add Arabic inscription to signs and documents. 59 This
is to be done, as the Israeli Supreme Court made clear, only as long as it does not
undermine the hierarchal relationship existing between the two languages under
which Hebrew is regarded as “senior sister.”60 Thus it has been stated that the
Palestinian-Arab community in Israel is “the most remote, excluded community
from the state’s metanaratives,”61 and enjoys the status of “second”62 or even
“third”63 class citizenship. In many respects this hierarchical structure has
determined the boundaries of the public sphere in Israel, 64 thereby also making it
possible to characterize the Palestinian-Arab community in Israel as “the invisible
and the Jewish Agency to perform semi-governmental activities, which, in light of their statutory mandate,
were restricted to the Jewish community, whether in Israel or in the Diaspora. Foremost among these
functions is the responsibility for agricultural settlement. As a result, “while many new agricultural
settlements have been created for the Jews, none have been established for Arabs.” Kretzmer,
Constitutional Law, supra note 5, at 50.
55
Henry Rosenfeld, The Class Situation of the Arab National Minority in Israel, 20 COMP . STUD . SOC’Y
& HIST . 374, 400 (1978) (stating that the State of Israel “fosters a Jewish state-nation ethos and economy
and therein sees the Arab strictly as a minority, or a series of minority groupings, and regards development
as relating specifically to Jews”); Mark A. Tessler, The Identity of Religious Minorities in Non-Secular
States: Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and Arabs in Israel, 20 COMP . STUD . SOC’Y & HIST . 359, 360 (1978)
(noting how Israel is firmly committed to a Jewish identity in different spheres that go beyond national
symbols).
56
See Gershon Shafir & Yoav Peled, Citizenship and Stratification in an Ethnic Democracy, 21 ETHNIC
AND RACIAL STUD . 408 (1998); Shachar, Whose Republic?, supra note 17, at 260-62.
57
See Yoav Peled, Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the
Jewish State, 86 A M. POL. SCI . REV. 432 (1992); see also Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Cultural Pluralism and
the Israeli Nation-Building Ideology, 27 INT ’L J. M IDDLE EAST STUD . 461, 462 (1995).
58
See Ilan Saban & Muhammad Amara, The Status of Arabic in Israel: Reflections on the Power of Law
to Produce Social Changes, 36 I SR . L. RE V. 5 (2002).
59
See Ayelet Harel-Shalev, Arabic as a Minority Language in Israel: A Comparative Perspective, 14
A DALAH’S NEWSLETTER 1, 5-6 (2005); BARZILAI, supra note 10, at 111-13.
60
See HCJ 4112/99, Adalah - The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. The Municipality
of Tel-Aviv Jaffa [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 393, 418 (per President Aharon Barak).
61
BARZILAI, supra note 10 at 7. See also As’ad Ghanem, State and Minority in Israel: The Case of
Ethnic State and the Predicament of its Minority, 21 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD . 428, 432-34 (1998) (stating
that as a result of Israel’s structural identification with its Jewish ethnic ideals the Palestinian-Arab
minority was collectively excluded from the official public domain of the state).
62
Ahmad H. Sa’di, Israel as Ethnic Democracy: What are the Implications for the Palestinian Minority,
22 A RAB STUD . Q. 25, 25 (2000).
63
SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 21, at 110.
64
Baruch Kimmerling, Sociology, Ideology, and Nation-Building: The Palestinians and Their Meaning
in Israeli Sociology, 57 A M. SOC. REV. 446, 450 (1992) (“[A]rabs in Israel] remained … outside of the
collectivity’s boundaries as nonmembers of ‘Israel.’”); M ICHAEL W ALZER, ON TOLERATION 41 (1997)
(noting how the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel, though citizens of the state, nevertheless “do not find
their history or culture mirrored in its public life”).
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man,”65 or as the “odd man out.”66 By virtue of the same process, the Jewish nature
of the State of Israel, this time in its religious form, also came to dominate Israel's
public sphere. 67 Accordingly, the entity of the State of Israel itself has become both
the domain as well as the instrument for handling the Jewish community’s religion
and state relations. 68 Moreover, the whole state political apparatus has been
recruited to help ease religious and state tensions among the different factions of
the Jewish community, namely the secular and the religious orthodox camps. 69
Since religion and state matters concerning the Palestinian-Arab minority were by
definition excluded from such a constitutional configuration, such matters simply
continued to be regarded as they were before the establishment of the State of Israel
– a group accommodation of a religious community that the state seeks to tolerate
as a group. Such accommodations were to stay a “private” matter, or to use one of
Virginia Woolf's famous titles – “a room of one’s own” instead of that of the
state. 70
¶17
Another important ingredient of this group accommodation perception is that
the religious accommodations of the different Palestinian-Arab religious
communities were conceived as a group accommodation of the Palestinian-Arab
minority in Israel as a national group, instead of just a group accommodation of a
particular Palestinian-Arab religious community. 71 Thus it became relatively
65

Sammy Smooha & Don Peretz, The Arabs in Israel, 26 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 451 (1982) (adding that
this characterization is also true with respect to the surrounding Arab countries that have also absented the
Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel from the overall Israeli-Arab conflict).
66
Joel S. Migdal & Baruch Kimmerling, The Odd Man Out: Arabs in Israel, in THROUGH THE LENS OF
ISRAEL: EXPLORATIONS IN STATE AND SOCIETY 173 (Joel S. Migdal ed., 2001).
67
See CHARLES S. LIEBMAN & ELIEZER DON-YEHIYA, CIVIL RELIGION IN ISRAEL: TRADITIONAL
JUDAISM AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE JEWISH STATE 12, 161-62 (1983) (stating that the conception of
civil religion in Israel that came to dominate the public sphere builds on the Jewish identity of the state of
Israel and thus excluded from it the Arab population in Israel).
68
Izhak Englard, The Conflict Between State and Religion in Israel: Its Ideological Background, in
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHURCH AND STATE 219 (Menachem Mor ed., 1993) (explaining how
the tendency to integrate Jewish religious institutions into the framework of the State of Israel did not meet
any substantial opposition, though motives of the secular and Orthodox camps varied).
Interestingly, in a relatively recent article it was stated that in the first two decades after the
establishment of the State of Israel, the Jewish religious camp was not successful in transforming the public
domain of Israel into a Jewish religious one. See Aviad Hacohen, “Medinat Yisrael, Kan Makom
Kadosh!”: Itsuv “Reshut Rabim Yehudit” bi-Medinat Yisrael ["The State of Israel – This is a Holy Place!”:
Forming a ”Jewish Public Domain” in the State of Israel], in SHNEY IVREY HA-GESHER: DAT U -MEDINA
BE -REISHIT DARKA SHEL YISRAEL [ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BRIDGE , RELIGION AND STATE IN THE EARLY
YEARS OF ISRAEL] 144 (Mordechai Bar-On & Zvi Zameret eds., 2002) (in Hebrew).
Even if I were to set aside the problematic classification that Dr. Hacohen makes in his article in
terms of differentiating between the “public” and the “private” domain (classifying, for example, issues
pertaining to the law of marriage and divorce and the determination of the status of a “Jew” as matters of
the private domain, id. at 145), his analysis seems to be totally irrelevant to the context of this study.
Nowhere in his article, does Hacohen compare the recognition that was nevertheless accorded to Jewish
religious institutions with the recognition accorded to the non-Jewish religious communities. Rather, his
analysis, like the vast majority of the scholarly work that dealt with religion and state in Israel, was
restricted to the intra-Jewish context.
69
CHARLES S. LIEBMAN & ELIEZER DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL (1984); A SHER
COHEN & BERNARD SUSSER, M I-HASHLAMAH LE-HASLAMAH: HA-SHESA HA-DATI-HILONI BE -FETAH HAM E’AH HA-ESRIM VE -A HAT [FROM A CCOMMODATION TO ESCALATION, THE SECULAR-RELIGIOUS DIVIDE
ST
AT THE OUTSET OF THE 21 CENTURY] (2003) (in Hebrew).
70
VIRGINIA W OOLF, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN (1929).
71
See supra note 27.
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common in the literature dealing with Israel's attitude toward the Palestinian-Arab
community to portray religious accommodations as a sort of “autonomy,”72 a
“multicultural entitlement,”73 and as a sign of “pluralism.”74 Returning to Israel's
definition as a "Jewish and democratic state", it is Israel's democratic and liberal
principles that serve as a constitutional anchorage for the grant of religious
accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab minority. 75
¶18
This narrative about religious accommodations being a form of liberal and
multicultural accommodation is totally absent from the discussion on the nature of
religious jurisdiction of Jewish institutions. In fact, this latter discussion
particularly stressed the coercive and illiberal nature of the jurisdiction of certain
Jewish religious institutions especially in matters of marriage and divorce, 76 and
that such a jurisdiction continued to exist as a matter of necessity, 77 compromise
and the need to preserve unity. 78 Moreover, because there seems to be a secular
majority within the Jewish community that would prefer to be free from certain
72
See Goldstein, The Teaching of Religion, supra note 19, at 40 (characterizing the judicial jurisdiction
of the non-Jewish religious communities to administer their religious law in matters of personal status as a
form of “communal autonomy of minority groups”); LANDAU, THE A RAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL, supra note
14, at 24 (noting that the autonomous administration historically enjoyed by the different religious
communities continued to persist in the State of Israel); ORI STENDEL, THE MINORITIES IN ISRAEL: TRENDS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE A RAB AND DRUZE COMMUNITIES 1948-1973 8 (1973) (stating that all of the
Palestinian-Arab religious communities “maintain a considerable measure of internal autonomy”); ERVIN
BIRNBAUM, THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE : STATE AND RELIGION IN ISRAEL 113 (1970) (noting how the
Ministry for Religious Affairs in Israel has “carefully safeguarded” the “autonomy” of the non-Jewish
religious minorities).
73
In fact authorities refer to all accommodations of the religious communities, Jewish and non-Jewish
alike, in terms of a group accommodation which is a form of a mult icultural accommodation. See A YELET
SHACHAR, M ULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND W OMEN’S RIGHTS 8 (2001)
(indicating that Israel together with India and Kenya have adopted expansive accommodation policies in
various social arenas); Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces
of Jurisdictional Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RE V. 385, 387 (2000) (stating that the concept of
differentiated citizenship, a synonymous concept of multicultural citizenship, is currently adopted in a
variety of different forms in Israel as well as in Canada, England, the United States, India and Kenya);
Shachar, Whose Republic?, supra note 17, at 263 (indicating that “[t]he communal autonomy granted to the
various recognized re ligious communities in Israel is important in terms of permitting different citizens to
preserve their cultural and religious group identity”); Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 1, at 105 (indicating
that personal laws, including those of religious segments are designed to preserve each community’s laws).
74
See Ruth Lapidoth, Religious Pluralism in Israel, 37 STUDI PARMENSI 45, 57 (1988).
75
Rubinstein, Law and Religion in Israel, supra note 2, at 390 (characterizing the government’s attitude
towards the Christian communities in Israel as “liberal” given the fact that such communities are in some
cases even directed and controlled from Arab countries).
76
In his recently published autobiography, Haim Cohn, a pre-eminent Israeli jurist, Supreme Court
justice and a champion of human rights, has called the rabbinical courts’ jurisdiction to adjudicate matters
of personal status (but interestingly just the rabbinical courts’ jurisdiction) as “a blot on Israel’s
democracy.” HAIM HERMANN COHN, MAVO ISHI: OTOBIYOGRAFIYAH [A PERSONAL INTRODUCTION
:A UTOBIOGRAPHY] 242 (2005) (in Hebrew).
77
See Stephen Goldstein, Israel: A Secular or a Religious State, 36 ST . LOUIS U. L.J. 143, 149 (1992)
(“Secular Zionists have sought to unify the Jewish population in Israel by constructing public life in a
manner that ensures full participation by religious Jews.”); see also EDELMAN, supra note 12, at 51 (in the
context of the jurisdiction ascribed to the rabbinical courts in Israel and the religious accommodation in
accordance with the status quo agreement, identifying the “extremely high value placed on the need for
unity”, especially in light of the fact that “the external threat to Israel has not disappeared”); Englard, supra
note 5, at 193 (noting that political compromises between Jewish secular and religious parties were
facilitated inter alia, by “the common striving for national unity”).
78
COHEN & SUSSER, supra note 69; Gidon Sapir, Religion and State in Israel: The Case for
Reevaluation and Constitutional Entrenchment, 22 HASTINGS INT ’L & COMP . L. REV. 617 (1999).
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religious norms, 79 it has been observed that this state of being, “turns the
conventional multicultural dilemma on its face, from a question of awarding
respect and rights to patriarchal minority culture at the expense of its own
members, into a question of imposition of the patriarchal minority culture over the
liberal majority, at the expense of the members of the majority.”80
¶19
This fundamental difference in the nature of the religious accommodations
granted to the Jewish community as opposed to those granted to the PalestinianArab communities was particularly highlighted by Israel's official justification for
the continuation of the Ottoman millet system. Israel’s arguments for preserving
this system have varied depending on the community. The argument associated
with the Jewish community (cumulatively or alternatively) stresses the political
necessities derived from the status quo document, the need for the major parties to
unite with the Jewish religious parties in order to form government coalitions, and
the need to preserve Jewish unity and Jewish heritage. 81 Israel’s argument with
respect to the Palestinian-Arab community has been based on the desire not to
interfere in this community’s internal religious affairs, 82 especially in light of the
fact that the “interfering” establishment was identified with a group that differs
religiously and faces national tensions with the nation of the Palestinian-Arab
minority.
¶20
Consider in this respect the observations of two Israeli scholars in the field of
religion and state. Professor Frances Raday has attempted to show how the
incorporation of the Ottoman millets in the Israeli legal system, especially in terms
of granting various religious courts the judicial capacity to apply their religious
norms, made it possible to preserve the existence of what she called “a patriarchal
legal system.” In explaining why Israel inherited the millets from the British
Mandate Professor Raday states the following:
There was a national consensus that there was a need to salvage the
remnants of a Jewish people and culture after these had been on the verge
of annihilation in the holocaust. In addition, this was the price exacted by
79

Margit Cohn, Women, Religious Law and Religious Courts in Israel, 27 RETFAERD: SCANDINAVIAN J.
SOC. SCI . 57, 58 (2004) (characterizing the problem of institutionalizing religion of the Jewish community
as an infringement on the rights of a liberal majority instead of the right of a religious majority to express
their beliefs); EDELMAN, supra note 12, at 60-61 (noting the troublesome fact that rabbinical courts in Israel
decide matters of personal status on the basis of halachic norms to which the majority of the Jewish
community does not subscribe). The division of the Jewish community between a secular majority and a
religious minority seems to have been made on the basis of surveys inquiring as to whether the Jewis h
public accepts the compulsory nature of Jewish religious norms, such as having only orthodox religious
marriage, the closing of shops and restaurants on the Sabbath, restricting public transportation on the
Sabbath and the funding of Jewish religious institutions. When asked about these issues, a considerable
portion within the Jewish community seems to be against such religious accommodations. See LEVY ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 8.
80
Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Women, Religion and Multiculturalism in Israel, 5 UCLA J. INT ’L L. &
FOREIGN A FF. 339, 343 (2000).
81
See, e.g., Rubinstein, State and Religion, supra note 3, at 115, 121; Maoz, Religious Human Rights,
supra note 2, at 363; Bassli, supra note 24, at 488-90.
82
See STENDEL , supra note 72, at 8 (Former Deputy Advisor in the Office of the Advisor to the Prime
Minister on Arab Affairs, the principal governmental office that articulated the official policy towards the
Palestinian-Arab community in Israel, stating that “[f]rom the establishment of the State, the government
policy has been not to interfere in the religious affairs of the various communities.”).
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the religious political parties for giving coalition support to the party in
power. Furthermore, there was a reluctance to intervene in the internal
social organization of minority communities. 83
¶21

Note the schism in the proposed arguments that explain the manner in which
the millet system has become part of the Israeli legal system—one set of arguments
is relevant for the Jewish community and the other set is relevant for the “minority
communities.”
¶22
Another statement embodying a contrast between the religious
accommodations granted to the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel and those
granted to the Jewish community is that of Izhak Englard, a former Supreme Court
Justice and Professor of Law who stated:
The problem faced by the substantial non-Jewish minority—mainly
Moslem and Christian Arabs—differs fundamentally from that of the
Jewish inhabitants. Their position is inevitably influenced by the broader
and age-old Israeli Arab conflict over Palestine. For them the issue is not
merely the place of religion in the modern state, but that the very existence
of the Jewish state has created a deeply felt national, and, for some,
religious dilemma … this politically delicate background has caused a
shifting of concern from individual freedom of religion to collective
autonomy. This tendency is probably one of the main reasons why the
traditional system of legally recognized religious communities exercising
jurisdiction over their members has been rigorously maintained in
contemporary Israel in relation to non-Jewish minorities. In fact, any
proposal to change the status quo in this field runs the risk of being
interpreted as an attempt to reduce the national cultural identity of the
Arab population. The whole problem of law and religion in relation to the
non-Jewish minority has, therefore, to be understood in the light of that
particular sensitivity and concern for collective Arab identity. 84
¶23

Israel's constitutional definition as a Jewish state that is also committed to
democratic ideals has determined the nature and justifications for the religious
accommodations of both the Jewish majority and the Palestinian-Arab minority.
The Jewishness of the state is considered to be the constitutional basis for
recognizing Jewish religious institutions and Jewish religious norms. However, it
is Israel’s democratic principles that led to the recognition of religious
accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab religious communities.

83

Frances Raday, Israel – The Incorporation of Religious Patriarchy in a Modern State, 4 INT ’L REV.
COMP . PUB. POL’Y 209, 210 (1992).
84
Englard, supra note 5, at 189-90.
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B. Substantiating Evidence of the Public/Private Nature of Religious
Accommodations in Regulation and Methodology
¶24

Two revealing pieces of evidence substantiate the assessment made here
about how religious accommodations of the Jewish community came to dominate
Israel's public sphere and by the same process, the religious accommodations of the
Palestinian-Arab minority were relegated to the private sphere of minority- groupaccommodations. The first concerns the public accommodation and state funding
of Jewish religious institutions and the second concerns the pervasive methodology
of texts dealing with religion and state in Israel that clearly shows its Jewish
centrality.
1. The Issue of Public Recognition and Public Funding

¶25

The Jewish community is far more privileged in the public accommodation
and state funding of its religious institutions. 85 The Chief Rabbinate of Israel is an
institution that is statutorily recognized, regulated, 86 and also fully supported by
public funds. 87 Specific legislation regulates Jewish religious services, 88 Jewish
religious councils, 89 and Jewish religious sites. 90 Also in the foreign diplomacy
arena, the Chief Rabbis of Israel receive protocol priority over the heads of other
religious communities in Israel. 91 The Israeli Ministry of Education operates a
religious school system alongside the regular Jewish school system. 92 There is no
equivalent legislative recognition of non-Jewish religious institutions. 93

85
See Francis Raday, Religion, Multiculturalism and Equality: The Israeli Case, 25 I SR. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
193, 213 (1995) (“Israel was established as a ‘Jewish State’ and this results in a preferred status for
Judaism….”) [hereinafter Raday, Religion, Multiculturalism and Equality]. Even official reports submitted
by the Israeli Government have admitted the great gap between state funding of Jewish and non-Jewish
religious institutions. See ISRAELI ICCPR REPORT , supra note 4, at 228 (“In comparison with funding of
Jewish religious institutions, the non-Jewish communities are rather severely undersupported by the
Government.”).
86
Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 97 (1979-80) (Isr.).
87
See Goldstein, The Teaching of Religion, supra note 19, at 39 (“State law regulates the appointment of
central and local rabbinic bodies, administrative as well as judicial, with all such bodies being financed by
state funds.”).
88
Jewish Religious Services (Consolidated Version) Law, 5731-1971, 25 LSI 125 (1970-71) (Isr.);
Kasher Food for Soldiers Ordinance, 5709-1948, 2 LSI 37 (1948-49) (Isr.); Prevention of Fraud in Torah
Books, Prayer Scrolls, Phylacteries and Mezuzot Law, 1974, S.H. 749; Prohibition of Fraud in Kashrut
Law, 1983, S.H. 1088; Prohibition of Opening Places of Entertainment on Tisha’a bi-Av (Special
Authorization) Law, 1997, S.H. 1637; Residence of Rabbis in their Place of Service Law, 2002, S.H. 1877;
The Counsel for the Perpetuation of the Heritage of Sephardic and Oriental Jewry Law, 2002, S.H. 1876.
89
See EDELMAN , supra note 12, at 52 (describing how religious councils work to minister to the
religious needs of the Jewish community in such matters as, maintenance of synagogues, cemeteries, ritual
baths, supervision of kashru t, and the appointment of marriage registrars).
90
See BARZILAI, supra note 10, at 109 (“Formally, state law protects all religious sites in Israel without
distinction [referring to Protection of Holy Sites Law, 1967]. Yet in a regulation issued by the minister of
religions, only Jewish religious places were mentioned as protected sites [referring to Protection of Holy
Sites Regulations, 1981].”).
91
Rubinstein, State and Religion, supra note 3, at 117.
92
See Goldstein, The Teaching of Religion, supra note 19.
93
Rubinstein, Law and Religion, supra note 2, at 400.
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Additionally, outright disparity exists at times between the budgets available
to Jewish religious institutions as opposed to non-Jewish ones. 94 This is true even
though some authorities might imply that support is divided equitably. 95 For
example, it was noted by one scholar that in 1981 the salary of a Rabbinical Court
judge (dayyan) was raised to the equivalent of “a magistrate in the civil court
system, but the salary of a Muslim qadi remained that of a Justice of the Peace.”96
Only in the mid-1990s did such patterns of disparity manage to receive some legal
attention from the courts. A civil rights organization, Adalah, The Legal Center for
the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel, proved to the Supreme Court that despite
the fact that the Palestinian-Arab minority composes approximately 20 percent of
the total population of Israel, its portion of the Ministry for Religious Affairs
budget amounted to only 2 percent. 97 However, even with this proof, the Cour t was
still unprepared to intervene until the petitioner offered further evidence showing
that specific religious services of each of the religious communities are treated
unequally by the Ministry for Religious Affairs. 98 This evidence was found in the
Ministry for Religious Affairs’ 1999 fiscal year budgetary allotment to cemeteries
operated by different religious communities. 99 While a sum of NIS 16.658 million
(equivalent to approximately US $3.7 million) was principally allocated to
cemeteries in the Jewish communities, only NIS 202,000 (equivalent to
approximately US $44,888) of the standing budget for cemeteries was allotted to
the non-Jewish population. In light of these findings, the Supreme Court instructed
the Ministry for Religious Affairs to divide its budget in accordance with the
principal of equal treatment between the cemeteries of the different religious
communities. 100 As noted by Professor Asher Maoz, the reality in which Jewish
94

Saban, supra note 27, at 943 (“Throughout Israel's history, there has been major, ongoing
discrimination in budgeting for religious services for the Muslim and Christian communities in comparis on
to that for the Orthodox Jewish community.”).
95
Ori Stendel, The Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel, 1 I SR . Y.B. HUM. RTS. 134, 152 (1971) (noting
how in the area of religious services Israeli government authorities have carried out improvements “on an
ongoing basis” with respect to Moslem religious institutions, whether constructing new mosques,
maintaining cemeteries and holy places and establishing local committees to handle community property);
Rubinstein, Law and Religion, supra note 2, at 388 (noting that though the affairs of the non-Jewish
religious communities in Israel are not all regulated by law, they still “enjoy Government support in
maintaining religious services”).
96
EDELMAN, supra note 12, at 78. However, this practice seems to have stopped after 1981. A table of
the current salaries of judges of all courts, including those of the rabbinical and Shari’a courts, can be
found at http://www.hilan.co.il/moked_yeda_lesachar/laws/mskchk66t.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
97
HCJ 240/98 Adalah The Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. The Minister
for Religious Affairs, [1999] IsrSC 52(5)167, 178.
98
Id. at 171.
99
HCJ 1113/99 Adalah The Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. The Minister of
Religious Affairs, [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 164 [hereinafter HCJ 1113/99 Adalah II].
100
It is also worth mentioning that this is not the first instance in which the Supreme Court has
intervened in budget allocations that were heavily biased in favor of the Jewis h community. In HCJ
1113/99 Adalah II Justice Zamir mentions the case of HCJ 2422/98 Adalah. The Legal Center for the
Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. The Minister of Labor and Welfare (not published), where it was
exposed that the Ministry of Labor and Welfare regularly gives out special allowances for the needy in the
Jewish community on the eve of Passover. No such practice existed concerning the needy members of any
of the Palestinian-Arab religious communities on the eve of any of their holidays. As a result of the
petition, the Ministry of Labor and Welfare agreed to amend its practice and to distribute the mentioned
allowances in an equitable manner. HCJ 1113/99 Adalah II, supra note 99, at 174.
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religious institutions enjoy substantially more state funding than other religions “is
more than just a matter of demography, that is, the vast preponderance of
(Orthodox) Jews in Israel.”101 It is attributed to “[n]ational, historical and political
factors.”102 Maoz adds:
Israel, as the homeland of the Jewish people, has assumed as one of its
major tasks the maintenance and development of Jewish culture and
tradition, which naturally have religious dimensions. Moreover, following
the Holocaust that destroyed the world center of Jewish learning, Israel
assumed the task of replacing those centers in Israel, and rebuilding the
institutions of learning destroyed in Europe. 103
2. The Issue of Pervasive Methodology
¶27

It is widely admitted that the pervasive methodology of study relating to
matters of religion and state in Israel is one in which the context of the discussion
as well as the normative implications are primarily Jewish. 104 For example, the
entrenchment of this phenomenon was evident when looking into a legislative
initiative undertaken by a Member of Knesset (MK) from the National Religious
Party, Nahum Langenthal, in 2000. The title of the bill proposed by MK
Langenthal was “Religion and State.” However, the section entitled “objective”
stated that the purpose of the draft bill was “to mold, regulate and determine rules
and principles in the matter of compatibility and relation of the Jewish religion in
the State of Israel.” The provisions of the draft bill make clear that the initiative
did not accidentally overlook the religious issues of the other religious communities
in Israel. For example, section 10 of the draft bill, appearing in the chapter
discussing the Sabbath as the official day of rest, specifically refers to regions in
Israel populated by a non-Jewish majority in which exemptions to the ordinary
rules may apply.
¶28
Another striking example is an article published by two researchers from the
social sciences entitled “Interreligious Conflict in Israel: The Group Basis of
Conflicting Visions.”105 The article focuses on the tension between the Jewish
Orthodox establishment and the secular camp, making clear that the discussion is in
fact intra-Jewish. No caveat even appears in the text acknowledging that the title of
the article may mislead readers to believe that the referenced interreligious conflict
might be among and between the Jewish community and the other 13 recognized
religious communities existing in Israel as well. These examples only reflect the
general trend in the research conducted on religion and state in Israel. For example,
a recent survey of research trends conducted on major subjects concerning
101

Maoz, Religious Human Rights, supra note 2, at 369.
Id.
103
Id.
104
See, e.g., Nachoum Langenthal & Shuki Friedman, Mevo [Introduction], in HA-KONFLIKT : DAT UM EDINA BE -YISRAEL [THE CONFLICT : RELIGION AND STATE IN ISRAEL] 9, 13-14 (Nachoum Langenthal &
Shuki Friedman eds., 2002) (in Hebrew).
105
Kenneth D. Wald & Samuel Shye, Interreligious Conflict in Israel: The Group Basis of Conflicting
Visions, 16 POL. BEHAV. 157 (1994).
102
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communities and state in Israel106 was written by Professor Eliezer Don-Yehiya, 107 a
renowned Israeli academic in the field of religion and state whose previous work
mainly concerned the political aspects of Jewish religious accommodations. 108 In
his introduction, Professor Don-Yehiya pointed to the complexity of the definition
of religion and state in Israel, given its relation to the national identity of Israel, its
society and the inter-communal relations existing among the different groups.
Thus the relevant research conjures up Zionism, political culture, the relationship
between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora and the relationship between Jews and
Arabs. 109 But as one proceeds to read the survey itself, it is striking how much the
subject, as perceived in practice, is Jewish oriented and homogenous in terms of the
communities surveyed. The survey redundantly focused on issues such as: the
status of halacha in Israel, the Jewish religious parties, the question of who is a
“Jew,” nationalism and fundamentalism within the Jewish religious community, the
status quo agreement, the ultra-orthodox community, the exact meaning of Israel as
a Jewish and democratic state as the structural context for the relation between
religion and state in Israel, and comparative studies on the standing of Judaism in
Israel as compared with the standing of minority religions in other Western
countries. Consequently, it was natural for one of the commentators on Professor
Don-Yehiya’s paper to caution against the possibility of researchers on the subject
of religion and state in Israel not having a proper knowledge of Jewish halacha. 110
¶29
This same trend found its way into the political and legal literature as well.
Major scholarly works on religion and state in Israel have also focused on the
tension existing between Jewish religious norms, accommodations given to Jewish
religious institutions, and secular-liberal ideals. 111 Treaties and surveys on family
106

M EDINA VE -KEHILAH [STATE AND COMMUNITY] (Moshe Naor ed., 2004) (in Hebrew).
Eliezer Don-Yehiya, State and Religion in Israel: Developments and Trends in Research, in STATE
AND COMMUNITY, supra note 106, at 151 [hereinafter Don-Yehiya, State and Religion in Israel:
Developments].
108
See, e.g., LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, CIVIL RELIGION IN ISRAEL, supra note 67; LIEBMAN & DONYEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL, supra note 69; Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Religion and Coalition:
The National Religious Party and Coalition Formation in Israel, in THE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL-1973 255
(Asher Arian ed., 1975); Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics:
The Impact and Origins of Gush Emunim, 23 M IDDLE E. STUD . 215 (1987); Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Religion,
Social Cleavages and Political Behavior: The Religious Parties in the Israeli Elections, in W HO’S THE
BOSS? THE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL, 1988 AND 1989 83 (Daniel J. Elazar & Shmuel Sandler eds., 1993);
Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Religion, Ethnicity and Electoral Reform: The Religious Parties and the 1996
Elections, in ISRAEL AT THE POLLS 1996 73 (Daniel J. Elazar & Shmuel Sandler eds., 1998).
109
Don-Yehiya, State and Religion in Israel: Developments, supra note 107, at 151.
110
Asher Cohen, Discussion, in STATE AND COMMUNITY, supra note 106, at 183.
111
See, e.g., Natahn Rothenstreich, Secularism and Religion in Israel, 15 JUDAISM 259 (1966); Aharon
Lichtenstein, Religion and State: The Case forInteraction, 15 JUDAISM 387 (1966); BIRNBAUM, supra note
72; S. CLEMENT LESLIE, THE RIFT IN ISRAEL, RELIGIOUS A UTHORITY AND SECULAR DEMOCRACY (1971);
Ephraim Tabory, Religious Rights as a Social Problem in Israel, 11 I SRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 256 (1981);
LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, CIVIL RELIGION IN ISRAEL, supra note 67; LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION
AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL, supra note 69; CHARLES S. LIEBMAN, RELIGION, DEMOCRACY AND ISRAELI
SOCIETY (1997); Izhak Englard, The Relationship Between Religion and State in Israel, 16 S CRIPTA
HIEROSOLYMITANA 254 (1966); Shimon Shetreet, Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Religion: A
Dialogue, 4 I SR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 194 (1974); Ariel Rosen-Zvi, Freedom of Religion: The Israeli
Experience, 46 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 213 (1986);
Norman L. Cantor, Religion and State in Israel and the United States, 8 TEL-A VIV STUD . L. 185 (1988);
Sapir, supra note 78; Shimon Shetreet, State and Religion: Funding of Religious Institutions – The Case of
Israel in Comparative Perspective, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUBL . POL’Y 421 (1999); Zaharah R.
107
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law—a discipline traditionally influenced by religious law—have also tended to
restrict their discussion to the Jewish community though their titles suggest that
they are relevant to Israel in general. 112
¶30
All of this cannot be coincidental. Given the Jewish nature of the state, the
subject of religion and state conflict has been transformed and essentially restricted
to a conflict between Jewish religious ideals and secular- liberal norms. The shape
and type of the public sphere that developed in Israel over the years, and is in
essence centered around Judaism, demanded this treatment of the religion and state
controversy. Just as Israel’s national symbols and ethos, concepts of citizenship,
and legislation of religious institutions is Jewish-centered, so are all other issues
that relate to religion and state.
¶31
However, it is not the intention of this article to suggest that minority
religions in Israel, primarily those of the Palestinian-Arab community, are
altogether excluded from public accommodations, whether it be in the form of
recognition or in the form of funding. For indeed, the Moslem, the Druze and the
major Christian communities all enjoy official legal status that affords them the
legal capacity to administer their own religious norms in matters under their
jurisdiction, a jurisdictional capacity that is essentially no different from that
accorded to the Rabbinical courts of the Jewish community. 113 In fact, the Moslem
Shari’a courts have historically enjoyed the widest jurisdictional authority in
matters of personal status, which corresponds to the adoption of the Ottoman millet
system by Israel. 114
¶32
Yet the thesis of this article is not about the religious freedoms of the nonJewish communities in Israel to practice and apply their religious norms through
their religious institutions. Rather, it is principally about the nature of religious
accommodations accorded to such communities in a state that is officially defined
as a Jewish state. This article argues that religious accommodations for the
Palestinian-Arab religious communities are perceived as accommodations justified
on the basis of a minority group right, and thus are fundamentally different in
nature from the religious “accommodations” allotted to the Jewish community.
The latter are commonly justified in terms of the nature of the State of Israel as a
whole.

Markoe, Note, Expressing Oneself Without a Constitution: The Israeli Story, 8 CARDOZO J. INT 'L & COMP .
L. 319, 327-28 (2000); Ezra Kopelowitz, Religious Politics and Israel's Ethnic Democracy, 6 I SR . STUD .
166 (2001); Shimon Shetreet, Resolving the Controversy over the Form and Legitimacy of Constitutional
Adjudication in Israel: A Blueprint for Redefining the Role of the Supreme Court and the Knesset, 77 TUL.
L. REV. 659 (2003).
112
See, e.g., BENZION SCHERESCHEWSKY, DINNEY M ISHPAKHA [FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL] (4th ed. 1993)
(in Hebrew); PINHAS SHIFMAN, MI M EFAKHED MI-NISSUIN EZRAKHI’IM? [CIVIL M ARRIAGE IN ISRAEL: THE
CASE FOR REFORM ] (1995) (in Hebrew); BOAZ KRAUS, GERUSHIN: M ADRIKH M A’ASI LE -GERUSHIN
[DIVORCE , A GUIDE TO FAMILY LAW ] (4th ed. 1998) (in Hebrew); M ICHAEL CORINALDI DINNEY ISHIM,
M ISHPAKHA VE -YERUSHA: BEIN DAT LE-MEDINA, MEGAMOT HADASHOT [STATUS, FAMILY AND
SUCCESSION LAW BETWEEN STATE AND RELIGION] (2004) (in Hebrew).
113
Raday, Religion, Multiculturalism and Equality, supra note 85.
114
See, e.g., Ori Stendel, The Arabs of Israel, Between Hammer and Anvil, 20 I SR . Y.B. HUM. RTS. 287,
302 (1990); EDELMAN, supra note 12, at 77.
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IV. THE PARADIGM OF SEPARATENESS RE- ENFORCED
¶33

In Israel, this paradigm of separateness was further entrenched in the religion
and state conceptual framework as a result of two other forces: The first is external,
brought to bear by state executive authorities, and the second is internal, derived
from intra-Palestinian-Arab perceptions.
A. External Re-Enforcements

¶34

The implementation of state policies regarding the Palestinian-Arab minority
has traditionally underscored the presumed security threat posed by the PalestinianArab minority remaining within the 1948 borders. 115 After all, this population not
only lost its majority status in what they considered their homeland; many members
were also displaced from their homes. 116 Moreover, many of the Palestinian-Arab
minority members were detached from close family relatives and some were even
considered legally absent, though physically present, making it possible for the
government to take over their possessions. 117 This minority was also an ethnic and
national continuation of a nation at war with the state in which they became
citizens. 118 Consequently, a number of measures were taken by state authorities
with the intention of controlling the Palestinian-Arab minority, thereby mitigating
their perceived threat to state security. 119 One such measure was the military
government imposed on the Palestinian-Arab population for more than 18 years
(1948-1966).120 Another method used was fragmentation—to create new and
115
Kimmerling, supra note 64, at 447 (“Arabs inside of Israel were suspected of being ‘a fifth column’
or a ‘Trojan Horse.’”).
116
See DON PERETZ, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN A RABS 91 (1958).
117
Over time, this odd legal status of present but legally absent personas came to be regarded as a
metaphor for the absence of the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel from many facets of Israeli society. See
DAVID GROSSMAN, SLEEPING ON A WIRE : CONVERSATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL (Haim Watzman
trans., 1993). The Hebrew title of the book is “Nochaheem Nifkadeem,” which literally means “Present
Absentees.”
118
See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, CIVIL RELIGION IN ISRAEL, supra note 67, at 165 (“Israeli
encouragement of an Arab national identity, including a measure of Arab autonomy, is fraught with the
danger of turning the population into agents of enemy countries, of encouraging them to demand territorial
separation from Israel and unification with a neighboring state.”); see also Rebecca Kook, Dilemmas of
Ethnic Minorities in Democracies: The Effect of Peace on the Palestinians in Israel, 23 POL. & SOC'Y 309,
312 (1995).
119
See LUSTICK, supra note 14.
120
Suhaila Haddad et al., Minorities in Containment: The Arabs of Israel, in THE POLITICAL ROLE OF
M INORITY GROUPS IN THE M IDDLE EAST 76, 84 (R.D. McLaurin ed., 1979) (“The principal tool employed
to control the Arab sector was the military government.”). In daily life, military government meant the
following:
[T]he military governor could “proclaim any area or place a forbidden area.” To enter or leave
such an area one needed “a written permit from the military commander or his deputy…failing
which he is considered to have committed a crime.” All the Arab villages and towns, even in the
Negev, were declared “security zones” (forbidden areas); so Arabs required permits from the
military government to leave and enter. Each village constituted, in effect, a separate zone,
making travel between villages subject to permission of the military governor. Article 109 of the
military government regulations allowed the military government to banish individuals – in
effect to force them to live in designated areas. Other such regulations permitted imposition of
partial or complete curfews in any area.”
Id. at 79.
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strengthen existing barriers—within the Palestinian-Arab minority groups, under
the premise that a segmented society could be controlled better. 121 The separate
religious communities of the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel proved to be a rich
natural resource that facilitated this fragmentation policy. 122
¶35
One characteristic mark of this government policy is to view the PalestinianArab community as separate religious groups while combining all other efforts to
deny the community’s collective national rights. 123 Thus, while in the na tional front
of state-minority, the Palestinian-Arab citizen is principally viewed in his or her
individual capacity, in the religious sphere the Palestinian-Arab citizen is
contemplated by his or her collective religious identity. 124
¶36
There may have also been another purpose behind the interest of the Israeli
establishment in maintaining the millet infrastructure among the Palestinian-Arab
minority, something that strengthened their separate and different nature even
further. The system also enabled the government to formalize differential treatment
among the various Palestinian-Arab religious communities that accorded to preconceived policies toward each one of them. 125 Such an attitude would have been
much harder to formalize if the religious accommodations of the different
Palestinian-Arab religious communities would have been regarded as public in
nature and thus susceptible to the regular body of norms governing public
institutions, religious or otherwise.
¶37
The Christian communities gained very little statutory recognition. 126 Such
communities appoint their own clergyman to serve as judges in Christian
ecclesiastical courts and they determine their internal court structure as they deem
necessary. 127 Moreover, each of the Christian religious communities appoints local
121

Id. at 80-81; LUSTICK, supra note 14, at 133.
NAOMI SHEPHERDED : PLOUGHING SAND, BRITISH RULE IN PALESTINE 1917-1948 245 (1999) (noting
how preserving the Ottoman millet system suited Israel’s interests, inter alia, for maintaining the status of
the Palestinian-Arab population not as one but several minority groups); KAIS M. FIRRO, THE DRUZES IN
THE JEWISH STATE: A BRIEF HISTORY 99-104 (1999) (depicting the formation of government policy in
preventing the creation of a single Arab group and in maintaining the different Palestinian-Arab religious
communities as divided groups).
123
See Gad Barzilai, Fantasies of Liberalism and Liberal Jurisprudence: State Law, Politics and the
Israeli Arab-Palestinian Community, 34 I SR. L. REV. 425, 436 (2000) (“The state inherited the mandatory
colonial recognition of religious communities or tribes, and has formally respected it so as not to be
domestically and internationally delegitimized. Yet, by formalizing and legalizing the religious aspect of
the minority, the minority’s other identities have been marginalized, enabling the State to better control
it.”); see also BARZILAI, supra note 10, at 97, 107 (“State law excludes the [Palestinian-Arab] minority by
framing it as religious groups that are entitled to a confined religious and juridical autonomy.”); Tessler,
The Identity of Religious Minorities, supra note 55, at 359-60 (1978) (noting the fact that the Arabs in
Israel are viewed as a religious minority).
124
During his first term as prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin specifically stated that Arabs in Israel
constituted only a cultural-religious minority rather than a political or national one, a statement that elicited
criticism from Palestinian-Arab political leaders. Haddad et al., supra note 120, at 93.
125
EDELMAN, supra note 12, at 76 (“While all Palestinians who are Israeli citizens share a common
linguistic and ethnic background, the Jewish authorities tend to treat each religious group as culturally,
economically and politically distinguishable.”).
126
Some churches operating in the State of Israel have been in fact directed and controlled by authorities
in other Arab countries, even when such countries had no diplomatic relations with Israel. See Rubinstein,
Law and Religion in Israel, supra note 2, at 390.
127
See I SRAELI ICCPR REPORT , supra note 4, at 227 (describing how the Christian communities actually
maintain the highest degree of independence in conducting their internal affairs).
122
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clergy who provide various religious services to their community members
according to the wishes of the heads of the relevant religious community. It is also
worth noting that most of the property held by the different churches prior to the
establishment of the State of Israel was retained in their possession. This
undoubtedly lenient and accommodating policy stems from the fact that from its
establishment, Israel's relation with its Christian communities was tied up with its
foreign policy towards the Christian West, 128 something that eventually worked to
shield local Christian communities from government intervention. 129
¶38
On the other hand, the government’s policies regarding the Moslem
community are genuinely different. First, all Moslem qadis to the Shari’a courts
are appointed by a special statutory committee. 130 Although the committee has
representatives from the Moslem community, its agenda was controlled by the
Minister of Religions, today the Minister of Justice. 131 In addition, local Imams are
appointed by the state and are in essence state officials. A substantial portion of
Moslem religious endowments (waqf), regarded as absentee property, 132 was
transferred to the hands of the Israeli government. 133 The Moslem community is
indubitably the largest Palestinian-Arab religious community in Israel, and is
perceived as posing a security threat due to its religious affinity with the
surrounding Arab countries. 134 As a result, government agencies have endeavored
to gain a stronger grip on the Moslem community in contrast to the regulation, or
the lack of regulation, of the Christian communities. 135
¶39
The relationship existing between the Druze community and the Israeli
government is completely different from both the Christian and Moslem
communities. With the establishment of the State of Israel, a close relationship was
constructed between the Israeli government and the leadership of the Druze
community which led to Druze male members being conscripted into the Israel
Defense Forces. 136 In due course, the Israeli establishment considered the Druze
identity as a national identity and not a mere religious attribute, making the Druze
128

See BIALER, supra note 13, at 122 (“From the first, the problem of Christian communities in Israel
was bound up and interrelated with the issue of Israel's relations with world church centers.”).
129
See RUBIN-PELED, supra note 25, at 7.
130
Qadis Law, 5721-1961, 15 LSI 123 (1960-1961) (Isr.).
131
BARZILAI, supra note 10, at 107; EDELMAN , supra note 12, at 77-78.
132
See Ilan Saban, Ha-Zekhuyot ha-Kibbutsiyot shel ha-Mi’ut ha-Aravi-Falestini: Ha-Yesh, ha-Ein veTkhum ha-Tabu [The Minority Rights of the Palestinian-Arabs in Israel: What Is, What Isn't and What Is
Taboo], 26 IYUNEI M ISHPAT 241, 282-85 (2002) (in Hebrew) (stating that government policy towards the
Moslem community’s religious endowments was conducted with a clear view to weaken the community
through diluting its power to control its property).
133
See KRETZMER, LEGAL STATUS, supra note 27, at 167-68.
134
EDELMAN, supra note 12, at 76 (“The Jewish majority generally considers the Muslims as the
greatest security risk. Their religion is perceived as yet another bond with the surrounding Arab forces
threatening Israel’s survival.”).
135
BARZILAI, supra note 10, at 108 (“The state is not interested in having a professional non-Jewish
juridical body [referring to the Moslem Sharia courts], which would be autonomous from direct state
political control. The state is interested in a religious body with partial religious autonomy, the Sharia court,
which in actuality is subject to supervision by Jewish Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox establishment in the
Ministry for Religious Affairs.”).
136
See Laila Parsons, The Palestinian Druze in the 1947-1949 Arab Israeli War, in NATIONALISM ,
M INORITIES AND DIASPORAS: IDENTITIES AND RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 144 (Kirsten E. Schulze et al.
eds., 1996).
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community even more distinct from their fellow Palestinian-Arab citizens. On
these terms, the Druze community was regarded as the most favored minority in
Israel and received full recognition as a separate and independent religious
community shortly after the establishment of the State of Israel. 137 Consequently,
the Druze religious courts became important political institutions controlled
entirely by the Druze community, including the process of selecting judges. 138
¶40
This disparate treatment of the Israeli establishment toward the different
Palestinian-Arab religious communities was to a great deal facilitated by
maintaining the separate and private nature of such accommodations. This
separateness made it possible to apply separate policies among such communities,
policies that because of the accommodation's private nature, were also "privatized"
to suit pre-conceived governmental policies.
B. Internal Re -Enforcements
¶41

The paradigm of separateness is also strengthened as a result of the internal
Palestinian-Arab minority conceptions of the nature of their religious
accommodations. 139 The discourse among community leaders, even those
belonging to secular political parties, 140 tends to focus on religious matters of the
Palestinian-Arab minority as minority affairs, autonomous in nature and distinct
from those of the Jewish majority. 141
¶42
This tendency was evident immediately after the establishment of the State of
Israel when calls were made for abolishing the millet system altogether.
Representatives of the Moslem community argued that such a move would amount
to a historical injustice, for when the Jews were a minority under Ottoman rule they
were accorded exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to personal status. 142 A
similar argument was made by representatives of the Christian churches who also
stressed the long-standing ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the country. 143
137

Aharon Layish & Salman Hamud Fallah, Ha-Irgun ha-Edati shel ha-Druzim, Communal
Organization of the Druzes, in HA-A RAVIM BE -YISRAEL: RETSIFUT VE -TMURA [THE A RABS IN ISRAEL:
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ] 123 (1981) (in Hebrew).
138
EDELMAN, supra note 12, at 90-92.
139
See Raday, Religion, Multiculturalism and Equality, supra note 85, at 194 ("After the founding of the
State, the religious autonomy retained by the non-Jewish minorities has continued to be regarded, from the
perspective of these communities, as a central element for their national cultural autonomy, representing, in
a wider sense, a form of community autonomy."); Lisa Hajar, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Arab
Women, Liberal Feminism and the Israeli State, M IDDLE E. REP . 207 (1998), available at
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer207/lisa207.htm (“[A]s long as Israel is a Jewish state, the Muslim, Christian
and Druze religious institutions will remain important sources of communal identity for Israel’s Arabs
(women and men) since the civil state is not really ‘theirs.’”).
140
See Danny Rubinstein Ha-Shesa ha-Dati-Khiloni Bekerev ArvieiYisrael [The Religious-Secular Rift
Among Israeli Arabs], in SHNATON DAT U -M EDINAH [STATE AND RELIGION YEARBOOK] 1993 89, 95
(Avner Horvits ed., 1994) (in Hebrew) (noting that within the Palestinian-Arab community in Israel there is
no “secular activism” in matters pertaining to family and social life and no real political agenda in this
respect on behalf of the main political parties, not even the communist party that has traditionally had a
strong national program).
141
EDELMAN, supra note 12, at 88 (noting how the Moslem Shari’a courts through their Qadis worked
to nourish the sense of their community’s sense of collectivity and separateness).
142
Haim H. Cohn, Religious Freedom and Religious Coercion in the State of Israel, in I SRAEL AMONG
THE NATIONS 79, 94 (Alfred E. Kellermann et al. eds., 1998).
143
Id.
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¶43

The tendency was also evident when government authorities sought to
introduce regulations that limited the application of certain religious norms or
religiously sanctioned practices. This was the case when government authorities
took control of Moslem waqf property, 144 when polygamy was criminalized, 145
when the jurisdiction of the Shari'a and Christian courts over maintenance claims
made by women against their husbands was made concurrent to civil courts instead
of remaining exclusive, 146 and when there was an initiative to abolish the practice of
dowry among members of the Moslem community. 147
¶44
The Palestinian-Arab religious leadership understandably internalized the
group right perception with respect to their individual religious communities,
because this perception helped to preserve and legitimize their power structure. 148
The political leadership on the other hand, contributed to the internalization process
primarily through acquiescence. 149 From their point of view, challenging existing
religious authority may cause internal friction among community members,
something that might jeopardize their political campaign for and among their
constituencies. 150 After all, patriarchy is still central to the social structure of the
Palestinian-Arab society in Israel – a patriarchy that to a large extent is embedded
and nourished by the existing religious institutions.
C. A Caveat on Group Rights Qualifications
¶45

Probably, the most peculiar feature about how the paradigm of separateness
was constructed and re-enforced is that this process managed to take place without
even inquiring whether what stands as the paradigm's most basic tenet is
normatively valid; namely, whether the religious accommodations accorded to the
Palestinian-Arab religious community in Israel, in their current form and context,
can be viewed under democratic and liberal ideals as indeed autonomous and
multicultural in nature. As the analysis afforded here will demonstrate, such a
qualification is in serious doubt. However, the fact that the autonomy and
multicultural perception persists only demonstrates how entrenched this basic tenet
of the paradigm of separateness has become.

144

See Michael M. Karayanni, Al ha-“Shelanu”: Rav-Tarbutiyut ba-Heksher ha-Aravi-Yehudi, [On the
Concept of “Ours”: Multiculturalism with Respect to Arab-Jewish Relations], 27 IYUNEI M ISHPAT 71, 9798 (2003) (in Hebrew).
145
See UZI BENZIMAN & ATALLAH M ANSOUR, DAYAREI MISHNEH [SUBTENANTS] 136-37 (1992) (in
Hebrew).
146
See Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals Tolerate Religious and
Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 154, 200 (2003).
147
See EDELMAN , supra note 12, at 80 (noting the objection of the Moslem judges (Qadis) to the idea of
reform through “the predominantly Jewish Knesset”).
148
David M. Neuhaus, Between Quiescence and Arousal: The Political Functions of Religion, A Case
Study of the Arab Minority in Israel: 1948-1990 16 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem) (stating that traditional religious institutions within the Arab minority have sought
to preserve traditional confessionalism “in their efforts to preserve the social structure from which their
authority derives”).
149
See RUTH HALPERIN -KADDARI , WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 276-77 (2004).
150
Ran Hirschl & Ayelet Shachar, Constitutional Transformation, Gender Equality, and
Religious/National Conflict in Israel: Tentative Progress through the Obstacle Course, in THE GENDER OF
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 205, 224-25 (Beverley Baines & Ruth Rubio -Marin eds., 2005).
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¶46

This paper assumes that not all group-based normative entitlements qualify as
“autonomous”, as “multicultural” or as “pluralistic” accommodations, at least when
judged in terms of liberalism. 151 For that to happen, certain conditions, or
“qualifying factors”, must be met. Indeed, in the literature dealing with
multiculturalism, scholars have already touched on such qualifying factors when
dealing with the question of whether a multicultural accommodation can be
considered legitimate when it also entails the application of norms that violate basic
conceptions of individual well-being. In an effort to help differentiate between
“good” and “bad” group-based entitlements, scholars have offered a basic
classification between such “good” accommodations that entail “external
protection” only (claims of the group against the larger society – such as when
allocating a representation quota for a minority group in governmental bodies) and
such “bad” group accommodations that entail “internal restrictions” and thus
legitimize group practices that violate basic human rights (claims of the group
against their own members – such as in the case of granting autonomy to a group
whose norms systematically discriminate on the basis of gender). 152 Some have
argued that a group accommodation of the latter kind can in some cases be possible
if the individual belonging to the group is offered the option to “exit” from the
group, thereby relieving himself, or most probably herself, of the internal
restrictions. 153 Serious questions therefore arise as to whether the existing group
accommodation granted to the Palestinian-Arab religious communities can qualify
as a multicultural accommodation.
¶47
The possibility of applying one’s religious law to his or her personal status is
problematic in many respects, at least from a liberal point of view. 154 First, the
individual member might be secular and thus not interested at all in conducting his
or her matrimonial life under a religious regime. The exclusive control of religious
law in matters of marriage and divorce thus compels Israeli citizens to tolerate a
body of norms that might be completely foreign to their personal beliefs. Second,
within the religious laws of the different religious communities there exist a
number of norms that are discriminatory in nature, especially in terms of gender.
In fact, many religious norms explicitly discriminate against women and work to
preserve the internal patriarcha l hierarchy. 155
¶48
One extreme example can be found in the Code of Family Law of the Greek
Orthodox community, which is essentially a code compiled in the fourteenth
century during the reign of the Byzantine Empire. 156 The Code allows for only a
limited number of reasons for divorce that are asymmetrically gendered. For
151

See Will Kymlicka, Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance, in TOLERATION: A N ELUSIVE VIRTUE
81 (David Heyd ed., 1996).
152
W ILL KYMLICKA, M ULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP : A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 37
(1995) (“[L]iberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness
between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question
and revise traditional authorities and practices.”).
153
See Oanagh Reitman, On Exit, in M INORITIES W ITHIN M INORITIES: EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND
DIVERSITY 189 (Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev eds., 2005).
154
See Rubinstein, State and Religion, supra note 3, at 117; Bassli, supra note 24, at 491, 516.
155
Frances Raday, Culture, Religion and Gender, 1 INT ’L J. CONST . L. 663, 669-76 (2003).
156
See F.M. GOADBY, INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-RELIGIOUS PRIVATE LAW IN PALESTINE 134-35
(1926).
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example, under the Code a husband can petition the Greek Orthodox court for
divorce if his wife slept outside of their house without his permission. However, a
wife cannot petition for divorce when the husband chooses to do the same without
his wife’s consent. 157 But the most intriguing aspect of the Code is the causes
enumerated in a special section on circumstances in which divorce is not to be
granted. According to the relevant provision, a wife cannot petition for divorce in
cases where her husband whipped her with a lash or hit her with a stick. This of
course is only a sample, albeit extreme in its content, of religious norms that do not
treat men and women equally in matrimonial matters. These are very severe
“internal restrictions”. Moreover, in the absence of a civil regime of marriage and
divorce in Israel, it is also questionable whether there is an option to exit from the
group, for there is simply nowhere to exit to.
¶49
In this author’s view there is yet a more serious flaw in the position which
views the religious authority granted to the different Palestinian-Arab religious
communities in Israel as a sort of “autonomy” or a group right of a “multicultural”
or “pluralistic” nature. To be regarded as such, one fundamental qualifying factor
also needs to be met. This qualifying factor concerns the “will” of the group itself.
It is essential that the group subject to the accommodation is interested in the type
of accommodation granted. Otherwise, and especially if the accommodation is in
the interest of a minority within that group, the group accommodation is at best just
a group accommodation and at worst a product of coercion. This fundamental
qualifying factor is derived not only from basic notions of justice, 158 but also from
the rationale of having multicultural and autonomous accommodations in the first
place.
¶50
If such accommodations are justified in terms of serving the interests of the
group members themselves, whether because individuals are embedded in their
community or because they need their community in order to realize their
individual virtues and aspirations, 159 it becomes essential that the group
accommodation accords with their interests instead of those belonging to some
minority group within them.
¶51
Take for example the case of two major religious communities: the Greek
Orthodox and the Moslem. The Greek Orthodox community is controlled by a
group of a foreign clergy from Greece, who can barely speak Arabic, the mother
tongue of the local Palestinian-Arab Greek Orthodox community. 160 Judges are
157
Michael M. Karayanni, “Yehudit ve-Demokratit” - Rav-Tarbutiyut ve-ha-Eda ha-Yevanit-Ortodoksit
[Jewish and Democratic: Multiculturalism and the Greek Orthodox Community], in HA-KONFLIKT : DAT UM EDINA BE -YISRAEL [THE CONFLICT , RELIGION AND STATE IN ISRAEL] 227 (Nachum Langental & Shuki
Friedman eds., 2002) (in Hebrew).
158
See IRIS M ARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 34 (1990) (“For a norm to be
just, everyone who follows it must in principle have an effective voice in its consideration and be able to
agree to it without coercion.”).
159
See W ILL KYMLICKA , LIBERALISM , COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989); Avishai Margalit & Moshe
Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to Culture, in 61 SOCIAL RESEARCH: A N INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 491 (Arien Mack ed., 1994).
160
DAPHNE TSIMHONI, CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN JERUSALEM AND THE W EST BANK SINCE 1948, A N
HISTORICAL , SOCIAL , AND POLITICAL STUDY 37 (1993) (observing how the Greek Orthodox Arab
community “considered the Greek upper hierarchy an alien element that has usurped the spiritual authority
of the church and its property from the indigenous Christians”). See also ROBERT BRENTON BETTS,
CHRISTIANS IN THE A RAB EAST , A POLITICAL STUDY 44 (revised ed. 1978).
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appointed to the Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical courts at the sole discretion of the
Church’s administration without any input or supervision from either state
authorities or community members. 161 It is worthwhile to mention that this
situation has existed in the past in a number of other Middle Eastern countries, such
as Egypt, but was changed through reform that abolished foreign control of local
churches. 162 However, calls from the local Palestinian-Arab community for change
have not been very successful, neither before nor after the establishment of the
State of Israel. 163
¶52
Thus, serious questions arise as to whether the existing accommodation
granted to this community is really autonomy or multicultural given the fact that its
form and practice run counter to the wishes of the constituency. Moslems’
community affairs have been handled over the years by qadis and imams coming
from the ranks of the community itself, but state authorities have applied different
control policies over the handling of community affairs. 164 This policy was evident
in the appointment process of such religious figures to their posts, always
conducted under the close supervision of government authorities. 165 A request
made by Moslem leaders to have a Moslem as head of Moslem affairs in what was
the Ministry of Religious Affairs was denied as the position was “passed from one
Jew to another.”166 But most probably, what really curtailed the community’s
control over its own affairs was the state authorities’ handling of the Moslem
religious endowments (waqf property). 167 Because various members of the
Supreme Moslem Council, the body that administered such property in Mandatory
Palestine, have left the country, this property was characterized as absentee
property via legal constructs. 168 In turn this made it possible for the State of Israel,
through the authority granted to the governmental organ, the Custodian of Absentee
Property, to take over such property. 169 Thus, it is once again questionable whether
the jurisdiction and authority granted to the Moslem community in Israel is really
autonomy or a genre of multiculturalism, even outside of the question of internal
restrictions and the option to exit.
161

Maoz, Religious Human Rights, supra note 2, at 357, 364; Rubinstein, Law and Religion, supra note
2, at 390.
162
Karayanni, supra note 157, at 238-40.
163
See Daphne Tsimhoni, The Greek Orthodox Community in Jerusalem and the West Bank 1948-1978:
A Profile of Religious Minority in a National State, 23 ORIENT 281 (1982) (observing it is because of this
distance between the local Greek Orthodox community and the Greek clergy that associations and clubs,
governed by community members, developed among the Greek Orthodox community); Daphne Tsimhoni,
Continuity and Change in Communal Autonomy: The Christian Communal Organizations in Jerusalem
1948-80, 22 M IDDLE E. STUD. 390, 398 (1986).
164
See RUBIN-PELED, supra note 25.
165
See supra text accompanying notes 130-135.
166
Tessler, supra note 51, at 265.
167
See PERETZ, supra note 116, at 126 (noting how the appointment of a Jewish official by the Ministry
of Religious Affairs to control waqf property and to be in charge of other functions regarding the Moslem
community “aroused much resentment” among the Moslem community religious leadership).
168
KRETZMER, LEGAL STATUS, supra note 27, at 167-68.
169
Id. It was once held that the Custodian of Absentee Property transferred the income received from
administering Moslem waqf to the Ministry of Religious Affairs who in turn distributed back to community
members according to the recommendation of an advisory committee. See Rubinstein, Law and Religion,
supra note 2, at 389. However, as things turned out, only a small portion of such income went back to the
Moslem community. See RUBIN-PELED, supra note 25.
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In light of this discussion it is thus remarkable how reference is still made to
the religious accommodations of the Palestinian-Arab religious communities in
terms of an autonomous jurisdiction and a genre of multiculturalism. This only
demonstrates how overwhelming the paradigm of separateness has become.
V. THE PARADIGM OF SEPARATENESS AND ITS NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

¶54

At the core of the paradigm of separateness identified here stands the claim
that religious accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab minority are a matter of
minority group accommodations. Yet, the same “accommodations” with respect to
the Jewish majority are considered to be a dictate of the Jewish nature of the State
of Israel. The first case concerns the “private” issues of minorities, and the second
case concerns the “public” nature of the State of Israel.
¶55
My argument in this respect goes further and suggests that this paradigm of
separateness carries with it a number of normative implications. In the interest of
succinctness, I will examine four different implications rather briefly. 170 The first
implication is dominance. The official Jewish nature of the State of Israel and the
Palestinian-Arab community’s internalization of the paradigm of separateness with
respect to religious accommodations created a legal environment with interesting
consequences. This environment made it possible to devise and shape, first and
foremost according to the interests of the Jewish community, public norms with
religious implications as well as legal reforms intended to benefit individual
members. I chose to term this type of normative implication “the dominance
effect.” This notion of dominance can be found in the Israeli adoption law,
particularly the stipulation that demands the adoptee be of the same religion as the
adopting parents. 171 This strict and uncompromising requirement was originally
implemented in Section 3 of the Adoption of Children Law, 1960, and was strongly
influenced by the sensitivity of the Jewish community to the possibility that Jewish
children could be adopted by non-Jewish parents. 172 The dominance was so strong
that this norm became the law of the land while overlooking the possibility that the
local Palestinian-Arab community might not be equally opposed to inter-religious
adoption among their community me mbers.
¶56
The second implication is what I chose to call “the distancing effect.” The
paradigm of separateness has a distancing effect on the individual members of the
Palestinian-Arab religious communities when it comes to liberal norms of the
individual-secular welfare of these members. In order to reach the individual
member and care for his, but mostly her, individual liberal rights, the paradigm
requires a justification of the infiltration of the outer and well- guarded limits of a
minority group’s existing autonomy on behalf of such an individual. 173 This barrier
170

For a detailed study in this respect see Michael M. Karayanni, A Group of One’s Own: A Dialectical
Legal Analysis of the Religious Accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 6 UCLA J.
ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. (forthcoming 2007).
171
Michael M. Karayanni, A Historical Analysis of the Religious Matching Requirement under Israeli
Adoption Law, 2 PALESTINIAN SOC’Y & HIST . REV. (forthcoming 2007) (in Arabic).
172
Id.
173
The effect of group-based norms on individual members has received particular attention in the
literature dealing with multiculturalism. Therefore, it has become particularly important to think of
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does not exist within the Jewish community, for once again its religious
accommodations are not perceived as a minority accommodation of an autonomous
and multicultural nature. On the contrary, many of the religious accommodations
within the Jewish community are viewed as a minority imposition made on the
majority who prefer freedom from religious norms and have strong secular
tendencies, or at least support the right to choose in regard to the ir own religious
accommodations. 174 Thus in the case of the Jewish community, change in religious
accommodations can occur once the liberal norm is preferred over the religious
norm. In the case of the Palestinian-Arab community there is an additional step
before this can happen: whether a group accommodation that is considered to be
autonomous ought to be changed by official state organs, whether by the courts or
the Knesset.
¶57
Examining scholarly historical analysis of the overall tendencies of courts
and government agencies to intervene in religious practices within each of the
communities is telling. The tendency has been to curtail and restrict the
jurisdiction of the Jewish community’s religious institutions and its ability to apply
religious norms, whereas the tendency with respect to the Palestinian-Arab
community was one of reluctance to interfere and effectuate changes. 175 A more
tangible example is illustrative: Jewish wives gained the legal right to bring a
maintenance claim against their husbands before a civil court in 1953, but the same
right was granted to Moslem and Christian women only in 2001. 176
¶58
The third implication concerns the internal dynamics that arose within the
Palestinian-Arab community as a result of both its perception of the nature and type
of religious accommodations accorded to its different religious communities and
the national conflict that exists between the State of Israel and the Palestinian-Arab
community as a whole. On a number of occasions, calls for liberal reforms from
within the Palestinian-Arab community were suppressed for fear of creating
internal conflicts within the religious communities that would eventually weaken
the national struggle. 177 This effect is termed herewith as “the internal barrier
mechanisms that can work to lessen this group-individual tension. See, e.g., M INORITIES WITHIN
M INORITIES (Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev eds., 2005); SUSAN M OLLER OKIN, IS
M ULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 9-24 (1999); Leslie Green, Internal Minorities and Their Rights, in
THE RIGHTS OF M INORITY CULTURES, 257, 258 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995).
174
See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
175
Compare Steinberg, supra note 23, at 100-101 (“Over time, the combination of religious/ideological
and political/cultural factors gradually led to a weakening of the consociational structure, and the clash
between secular and religious norms has become particularly pronounced. The expanded authority and
scope taken on by the secular court system in the past decade has contributed to the undermining of the
status quo. Under the influence of Judge Aharon Barak (Chief Justice of the High Court of Appeal [sic]),
the courts have entered into areas and assumed powers that had, in the past, been rejected by the secular
courts as outside their areas of jurisdiction.”), with EDELMAN , supra note 12, at 87 (“For their part, the
Jewish majority has not been anxious to upset Muslim sensibilities on matters of personal status. There
have been only isolated legal actions to bring the Shari’a Courts into strict compliance with Israeli
law…On matters of personal status, the Jewish elite is more concerned with modernizing the practices of
their fellow Jews who came to Israel from Arab lands. The governing elite’s priorities are reflected in the
more restricted jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Courts and the greater administrative-legal supervision of
personal status practices within the Jewish population.”).
176
Compare § 4 Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law 5713-1953, 7 LSI 139
(1952-53) with § 3(b1) of the Court of Family Affairs Law, 1995, S.H. 1537 (enacted in 2001, S.H. 1810).
177
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effect.” An extreme example can be found in the notes of a Palestinian-Arab
sociologist who studied the phenomena of the murder of Palestinian-Arab women
for the alleged shame they caused to their family or clan (“honor killing”). 178 One
argument she encountered, which was supported by community leaders, was that
this was not the time for raising such an issue, even though the same community
leaders stood against the phenomenon. 179
¶59
The fourth normative implication of the paradigm of separateness is
genuinely different from the previous three because it implies the possibility of
greater reform in the religious accommodations granted to the Palestinian-Arab
community. These accommodations differ from those granted to the Jewish
community, meaning it may be possible to make such accommodations susceptible
to different sets of considerations and norms than those relevant to the Jewish
community. This implication should be emphasized given the fact that, as the
socio-political reality that exists in Israel demonstrates, there are more spheres in
which the Palestinian-Arab community can move for more liberal reforms than
those in the Jewish community. The paradigm of separateness should work to
facilitate such reforms, for it also implies that the impediments to reform within the
Jewish community do not similarly impede the Palestinian-Arab community. A
meaningful precedent can be found in the basic legal instrument regulating
surrogacy agreements in Israel, the Surrogate Mother Agreement (Approval of the
Agreement and the Status of the Child) Law, 1996. 180 This enactment was heavily
influenced by Jewish halacha, especially in determining the kind of preconditions
necessary for making legal and valid surrogacy agreements. 181 One such
precondition is the requirement contained in Section 2(5) of the Law under which
the carrying mother must be of the same religion of the intended mother. 182
However, because the dictates of the Jewish halacha are irrelevant to the nonJewish population, the same section continues to prescribe that the statutory
committee in charge of approving surrogacy agreements can deviate from the
religious matching requirement “where all parties to the agreement are nonJews.”183 Thus, one is also able to imagine that a less restrictive religious matching
Yisrael: Rashei Prakim le-Diyun, [A Constitutional Ontology of the Religious Accommodations of the Arab
Minority in Israel: General Topics for Discussion], in KHASAMIM BIFNEI SHIVYON; HA-A RAVIM BE YISRAEL [A RABS IN ISRAEL, BARRIERS TO EQUALITY] 43 (Shlomo Hasson & Michael M. Karayanni eds.,
2006) (in Hebrew).
178
Manar Hasan, Ha-Politika shel ha-Kavod: Ha-Pariarkhiya, ha-Medina ve-Retsakh Nashim Beshem
Kvod ha-Mishpakha [The Politics of Honor: The Patriarchy, the State and the Murder of Women in the
Name of Family Honor], in M IN M IGDAR POLITIKA [SEX GENDER POLITICS] 267, 297-301 (Dafna N.
Izre’eli et al. eds., 1999) (in Hebrew).
See also Aida Touma-Sliman, Culture, National Minority and the State: Working Against the “Crime of
Family Honour” within the Palestinian Community in Israel, in ‘HONOUR’ CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND
VIOLENCE AGAINST W OMEN 181, 182 (Lynn Welchman & Sara Hossain eds., 2005).
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Carmel Shalev, Halakha and Patriarchal Motherhood – An Anatomy of the New Israeli Surrogacy
Law, 32 I SR. L. REV. 51, 60 n.26 (1998) (“It should be noted that the terms ‘surrogate motherhood’ or
‘surrogacy’ are not used in the Hebrew title of the law. If the title had been literally translated it would have
read as ‘Embryo Carrying Agreements.’”).
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Id.
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Id. at 66-67.
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S.H. 1577, § 2(5).
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requirement can apply in adoptions taking place in Israel among adopters and
adoptees from the Palestinian-Arab community. For once again the place and
meaning of religion in preserving the national unity and interests of the PalestinianArab minority are separate and different from those relevant for the Jewish
community. However, it remains to be seen how far the Palestinian-Arab minority
will be able to pursue this path for change and reform. As previously discussed,
external and internal forces have worked to enforce separateness among the
different Palestinian-Arab religious communities. This state of being is also
influenced by a patriarchal social structure.
VI. CONCLUSION
¶60

The discussion in this article purports to offer a legal diagnosis of how
religious accommodations of the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel are perceived
through dominant views. This article has suggested that a legal paradigm is
apparent in matters concerning the Palestinian-Arab religious communities, which
is perceived as an autonomous accommodation for a minority group. As the
preceding discussion endeavored to show, the paradigm of separateness is closely
linked to Israeli constitutional and political conceptions. However, it is equally
important to note that if these arguments prove to be valid in the Israeli context,
they might also be helpful in understanding the role religion plays within the state
in a number of other countries in which the majority religion acquires some form of
constitutional and political dominance. This could be especially true in such states
that have recognized some form of relationship between religion and state that have
caused certain tensions to evolve between the different groups.
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